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INTRODUCTION
Fiduciaries sometimes behave badly. Misconduct might be innocuous,
or it might result in the theft of someone’s entire life savings. Fiduciary
misconduct appears to be a booming business thanks, in part, to an aging
population. The elderly are particularly susceptible to financial abuse,
including abuse resulting from fiduciary misconduct. As America’s aging
population continues to grow, attorneys can expect to see an increase in
the number of cases of fiduciary misconduct.
Louisiana, like many states, has taken important steps to help protect
vulnerable populations. Yet many gaps remain. Moreover, Louisiana lacks
comprehensive guidance for practitioners and courts who deal with cases
of fiduciary misconduct. This Article attempts to fill a small part of that
gap with respect to three fiduciaries in the estate-planning setting: (1) the
mandatary, also known as agent, power of attorney, or attorney-in-fact;
(2) the succession representative, also known as the executor or the
administrator; and (3) the trustee.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a general overview of
fiduciary responsibility and some of the important distinctions between the
common law and civil law traditions. Parts II, III, and IV each address a
particular fiduciary relationship in Louisiana and the related litigation
issues. Part II addresses mandataries; Part III addresses succession
representatives; and Part IV addresses trustees.
I. FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY IN GENERAL
Both common law and civil law jurisdictions impose a particularly
high standard of care on a person who is in a position of trust or authority
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with respect to another person or his property. This notion is often referred
to as a fiduciary relationship. The legal regulation of that relationship,
however, differs in important ways between the civil law tradition and the
common law tradition. Although an exhaustive history and description of
these distinctions is beyond the scope of this Article, some background
will be helpful in understanding the challenges and nuances of fiduciary
responsibility in Louisiana.
The theoretical underpinnings of fiduciary relationships differ in the
two systems: “The common law draws the regulation of fiduciaries mainly
from property law, while in the civil law it is based on contract.”1 Lawyers
familiar with the difficulty of importing trust law into Louisiana should
readily see the importance of this distinction. Traditionally, the fiduciary
relationship at common law stemmed from a bifurcation of ownership
between the “legal” owner of the property and the “equitable” owner of
the property.2 Many of the principles regulating fiduciary relationships are
rooted in that division of ownership, a division that is generally
inconsistent with civilian property concepts.3 Civil law recognizes
fiduciary relationships under the umbrella of obligations. Specifically, all
obligors are bound to act in good faith.4 Particular obligations have more
onerous standards of performance and result in greater liability for the
obligor. The distinctions between common law and civil law can be subtle
and are sometimes difficult to differentiate.5 The two systems often lead
to similar conclusions. The distinctions do, however, have significant
consequences in some circumstances. They are also important in
understanding the role—and liability—of fiduciaries in Louisiana.
A. Fiduciaries in the Common Law Tradition
The term “fiduciary” is usually associated with the common law
tradition. Yet both the term and the concept have civil law roots. Those
civil law roots evolved considerably in the common law system, leading
to significant distinctions between the two legal systems in the modern era.

1. Tamar Frankel, Toward Universal Fiduciary Principles, 39 QUEEN’S L.J.
391, 394 (2014).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 399.
4. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759 (2018).
5. E.g., Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82
MARQ. L. REV. 303, 303–04 (1999) (discussing debate among common law
scholars regarding whether fiduciary relationships are based on contract).
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1. Development of the Body of Law
The term “fiduciary” is usually traced to two Roman law institutions:
the fideicommissum and fiducia. The “fideicommissum was primarily a
succession tool by which property was transmitted to one person (the
fiduciarius) to then be transmitted to another (the fideicommissius).”6 The
fiducia “provided a mechanism by which property could be conveyed to
another while at the same time providing what was to be done with the
thing conveyed.”7 Both the fideicommissum and the fiducia bore some
resemblance to the common law trust because they both placed one party
in a position of power or authority over property belonging to another.8
These Roman legal notions were adopted and adapted by the Catholic
Church for its own purposes.9 In the Church’s hands, the fideicommissius
evolved into the utilitas ecclesiae that, in turn, evolved into the common
law “uses.”10 Legal development continued under the guidance of the
Church by way of its jurisdiction over probate matters.11 Jurisdiction over
uses eventually moved to the Court of Chancery, and trusts eventually
replaced uses.12 In the Court of Chancery, the term “trust” evolved into a
distinct legal concept, and other trust-like fiduciary relationships were
described and regulated by analogy.13 Today, the body of law known as
fiduciary relationships is usually associated with the common law system
and, in particular, with the law of trusts. Modern cases continue to define
fiduciary responsibility in a variety of contexts by reference to its trust law
origins.14
6. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Some Fundamentals of Trusts: Ownership or
Equity in Louisiana?, 92 TUL. L. REV. 53, 63 (2017); John Minor Wisdom, Trust
Code in the Civil Law, Based on the Restatements and Uniform Acts: The
Louisiana Trusts Estates Act, 13 TUL. L. REV. 70, 71–73 (1938).
7. Scalise, supra note 6, at 65 (internal quotation omitted).
8. See id.
9. See Myron T. Steele, The Moral Underpinnings of Delaware’s Modern
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 3, 8 (2012).
10. Id. at 8–9. Uses may have had other sources, too. See, e.g., David J. Seipp,
Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (2011).
11. Steele, supra note 9, at 11–12.
12. Seipp, supra note 10, at 1024–25.
13. E.g., L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 20 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 71
(1962); Jerry M. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199, 210 (1992); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 37 DUKE L.J. 879, 880 (1988).
14. See, e.g., Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 225 (Del. 1999) (“The common
law fiduciary relationship created by a durable power of attorney is like the
relationship created by a trust. The fiduciary duty principles of trust law must,
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2. Contemporary Fiduciary Relationships
Common law recognizes innumerable fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary
relationships may arise by operation of law or by the particular facts of a
case.15 A fiduciary relationship exists “as a matter of law from certain
specified relationships.”16 Relationships that are deemed fiduciary as a
matter of law include the attorney–client relationship,17 the relationship
between an attorney-in-fact or agent and a principal,18 the trustee–
beneficiary relationship,19 and the relationship between the executor or
administrator and the estate.20 Civil law likewise imposes fiduciary-like
standards on these relationships but continues to do so under the umbrella
of the law of obligations. Breach of a fiduciary duty in common law, in
contrast, is generally considered a tort action.21
A fiduciary relationship in common law may also “exist as a matter of
fact in such instances when there is ‘confidence reposed on one side, and
the resulting superiority and influence on the other.’”22 Whether a
fiduciary relationship exists due to the facts “often turn[s] on questions of
fact related to exertion of influence, whether a party trusted and relied on
another party, and whether the reliance was justified.”23 Civil law, in
contrast, does not generally recognize fiduciary relationships that arise as
a matter of fact.24
therefore, be applied to the relationship between a principal and her attorney-infact.”); Steele, supra note 9, at 15 (describing how “[a]gency law originated from
uses and trusts,” as well as the general origins of trusts).
15. See, e.g., Azure Dolphin, LLC v. Barton, 821 S.E.2d 711, 726 (N.C.
2018); Gibson v. Williams, 186 So. 3d 836, 851 (Miss. 2016).
16. Gibson, 186 So. 3d at 851.
17. E.g., Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572
S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2019); Gibson, 186 So. 3d at 851.
18. E.g., Lingo v. Lingo, 3 A.3d 241, 244 (Del. 2010); Archbold v.
Reifenrath, 744 N.W.2d 701, 706–07 (Neb. 2008).
19. E.g., Sykes v. Health Network Sols., Inc., 828 S.E.2d 467, 476 (N.C.
2019); Bombardier, 572 S.W.3d at 220; In re Estate of Carter, 912 So. 2d 138,
145 (Miss. 2005).
20. E.g., St. Bernard Sch. of Montville, Inc. v. Bank of Am., 95 A.3d 1063,
1077 (Conn. 2014); In re Estate of Carter, 912 So. 2d at 145.
21. See, e.g., LCL, LLC v. Falen, 422 P.3d 1166, 1171 (Kan. 2018); Alliant
Bank v. Four Star Invs., Inc. 244 So. 3d 896, 914 (Ala. 2017).
22. Azure Dolphin, LLC v. Barton, 821 S.E.2d 711, 725 (N.C. 2018).
23. Gibson v. Williams, 186 So. 3d 836, 852 (Miss. 2016).
24. E.g., Lucky v. Carr, 264 So. 3d 693, 696 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2019)
(noting that a fiduciary relationship could not exist in the absence of an underlying
contract of mandate).
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Two primary duties are the defining features of the common law
fiduciary relationship: the duty of care—or prudence—and the duty of
loyalty.25 A third duty of good faith and fair dealing is also an important
component of fiduciary relationships.26 Some courts describe this third
duty in a manner that suggests it is part of the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty;27 others suggest that it is a stand-alone duty.28
Generally, the duty of care refers to the fiduciary’s responsibility to
act with a degree of skill and caution.29 This duty dictates how a fiduciary
should act with respect to any property that is under his control. For
example, the duty of care or prudence requires a trustee to “administer the
trust as a prudent person would” and to “exercise reasonable care, skill,
and caution in doing so.”30 Related subsidiary duties flow from the
overarching duty of care and depend on the specific type of fiduciary
relationship. For example, trustees have various safeguarding and
earmarking duties with respect to trust property.31 Trustees are obligated
to collect the trust property, to earmark it as trust property, and to segregate
it from other property under their care.32 The duty of care also governs
how a fiduciary should invest and manage any property under his
administration. Depending on the type of fiduciary relationship, the duty
of care, or prudence, may prevent a fiduciary from investing in speculative
or risky ventures.33

25. E.g., Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 932 (Pa.
2017); Forbes v. Forbes, 341 P.3d 1041, 1051 (Wyo. 2015).
26. E.g., In re Estate of Ross, 131 A.3d 158, 167 (R.I. 2016); In re Sky Harbor
Hotel Props., LLC, 443 P.3d 21 (Ariz. 2019).
27. E.g., Acorn v. Moncecchi, 386 P.3d 739, 760–61 (Wy. 2016) (describing
the same conduct as breaching the duty of good faith and loyalty); Tucker v.
Brown, 150 P.2d 604, 620 (Wash. 1944) (describing the duty of loyalty as
requiring “that a trustee must act with the most scrupulous good faith.”).
28. E.g., In re Sky Harbor Props., 443 P.3d at 23 (“Thus, the nature of the
fiduciary relationship for agents includes a duty of loyalty, a duty of good faith,
and a duty of care.”); F.D.I.C. v. Myers, 955 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1992)
(suggesting that fiduciary duty is different from duty of good faith and fair
dealing).
29. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 541 (2d ed. 1977).
30. Id.
31. See id. § 596.
32. See id. §§ 541, 596.
33. See, e.g., Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Col. 1989) (en banc)
(custodian of children’s funds breached fiduciary duty in investing in highly
speculative penny stocks); Carlson v. Wells, 705 S.E.2d 101, 106–07 (Va. 2011)
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The duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to act in the interest of the
beneficiary within the fiduciary relationship rather than his own selfinterest.34 This duty imposes limitations on a fiduciary’s ability to engage
in self-dealing and requires him to disclose and avoid conflicts of
interest.35 The duty of loyalty may also impose a duty to act impartially
when the fiduciary owes duties to more than one person.36 Again, the
nuances of the duty of loyalty and the available remedies are dictated by
the fiduciary relationship in question.
B. Fiduciaries in the Civil Law Tradition and in Louisiana
Civil law has long recognized and regulated a number of relationships
that common law would describe as fiduciary relationships. In the civil
law tradition, however, liability is imposed by the law of obligations rather
than by property or tort. Although civil law and common law share some
common legal roots, the role of the fiduciary has evolved somewhat
differently in the two systems.
1. Fiduciaries in Roman Law
Roman law recognized several fiduciary-like relationships. For
instance, Roman law recognized the contract of mandate and defined it as
a contract where “one person (mandatarius) gratuitously undertook to do
some act at the request of another.”37 Roman law held the mandatary to a
higher standard of care by subjecting him to liability for deficient
performance or failure to perform. Mandate was “founded on good faith
and honour, a breach of it, or even negligence in the performance of the
promise, induced the penalties of infamy.”38 Roman law imposed a
number of duties upon the mandatary: (1) to perform the mandate accepted
(custodian of minors’ funds held in Uniform Transfer to Minors Act accounts
breached his duty of care in investing in airline on the brink of bankruptcy).
34. See, e.g., Knudson v. Kyllo, 831 N.W.2d 763, 766 (N.D. 2013) (noting
that the “partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners”
includes duties to account for any profit made, to avoid conflicts of interest, and
to “refrain from competing with the partnership”); In re Philbrick’s Estate, 229
N.W.2d 573, 576 (Wis. 1975) (“The duty of loyalty requires that the executor not
be motivated in his actions by self-interest or the interest of third parties.”).
35. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 543.
36. See id.
37. R.W. LEAGE, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW FOUNDED ON THE ‘INSTITUTES’ OF
GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN 304 (1909).
38. 2 PATRICK MAC CHOMBAICH DE COLQUHOUN, A SUMMARY OF THE
ROMAN CIVIL LAW § 813 (1849).
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by him; (2) to diligently follow the instructions of the mandate; (3) to turn
over any property acquired as a result of the mandate, including any profit
made by the mandatary; and (4) to render an account of his actions.39 The
standard of performance incumbent upon the mandatary was more onerous
than that of many other contracts.40
Roman law also imposed fiduciary-like standards on tutors, who were
appointed to manage the property of young children, and curators, who
were appointed to manage the property of older children and adults who
lacked mental or physical capacity to manage their own property.41 The
rules governing tutors and curators were essentially the same. Tutors and
curators were held to exceptionally high standards because they managed
the property of people who could not act to adequately protect themselves.
Although tutors and curators are not the primary focus of this Article, the
modern rules governing other fiduciaries are based on those of tutors and
curators.
The position of tutor or curator “was one of honor and duty” at Roman
law.42 As such, not everyone was permitted to serve as a tutor—the
position was generally limited to citizens who were at least 25 years old.43
Certain individuals were disqualified from serving as tutors or curators
because they either lacked the required skills or abilities or could not be
trusted. A person might lack the required skill or ability due to poverty,
poor health, illiteracy, blindness, or advanced age.44 A person might have
a conflict of interest that disqualified him from office. Creditors and
debtors of the pupil or of the pupil’s family were typically disqualified. 45
Enemies of the pupil or of his family were likewise disqualified.46 A

39. WILLIAM A. HUNTER, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 48–50 (A.F.
Murison ed., 1921); LEAGE, supra note 37, at 306–07.
40. Id.
41. MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW §§ 1751–52 (Louisiana
State Law Institute trans., West 1959); HUNTER, supra note 39, at 48–50.
42. WILLIAM L. BURDICK, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION
TO MODERN LAW 266 (1938).
43. Id.
44. ANDREW STEPHENSON, HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW: WITH A COMMENTARY
ON THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN 366–67 (1912); Charles P. Sherman,
The Debt of the Modern Law of Guardianship to Roman Law, 12 MICH. L. REV.
124, 125–26 (1913).
45. STEPHENSON, supra note 44, at 366–67; 3 MAC CHOMBAICH DE
COLQUHOUN, supra note 38, § 1736.
46. See STEPHENSON, supra note 44, at 366–67; 3 MAC CHOMBAICH DE
COLQUHOUN, supra note 38, § 1736.
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person appointed as tutor or curator was morally—and legally—obligated
to serve unless he had a valid excuse.47
The duties of the tutor and curator were, in many respects, similar to
that of the mandatary. In administering the property under his care, the
tutor or curator “had to act with absolute good faith and bestow the same
care upon the affairs of his ward that a sensible man is expected to use in
his own affairs.”48 The tutor or curator could be held liable for fraud,
neglect, or waste of the property under his care.49 Self-dealing by the tutor
or curator was generally prohibited. He could not “reap any advantage
from his office,” nor could he “authorize any act on the part of his ward
that would result in enrichment to himself.”50 Finally, the tutor or curator
had to account for his administration.51
Additional safeguards further protected the interest of the pupil.
Safeguards were necessary because the pupil was incapable of sufficiently
protecting his own interests. In that respect, the nature of the relationship
differed from that between a principal and his appointed mandatary. The
principal generally had the ability to act for himself to protect his own
interests and could terminate the authority of his mandatary at will.
To protect the pupil, the tutor or curator was often required to post
security to ensure his competent performance.52 He was also required to
have an inventory made of the pupil’s property.53 The tutor or curator
faced civil, and even criminal, penalties for his malfeasance. He could also
be removed from office on the grounds of suspicion. Because the pupil
could not bring an action for removal in his own right, many other
individuals had both the ability and the duty to bring such actions to protect
the interests of the pupil.54 General incompetence, neglect for the pupil’s
well-being, and hostility between the pupil or his family and the tutor or
curator were likewise grounds for removal.55

Sherman, supra note 44, at 124–25.
STEPHENSON, supra note 44, at 365.
BURDICK, supra note 42, at 265–66; Sherman, supra note 44, at 124.
3 MAC CHOMBAICH DE COLQUHOUN, supra note 38, § 1736.
Id.
BURDICK, supra note 42, at 267; Sherman, supra note 44, at 124–25.
BURDICK, supra note 42, at 267; Sherman, supra note 44, at 124–25.
BURDICK, supra note 42, at 267; Sherman, supra note 44, at 124–25.
HENRY JOHN ROBY, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW IN THE TIMES OF CICERO AND
OF THE ANTONINES 110 (1902); STEPHENSON, supra note 44, at 366–67.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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2. Fiduciaries in Louisiana: Requirement of Good Faith
All of the Louisiana fiduciaries that this Article considers have an
overarching obligation of good faith. The requirement of good faith is
similar in both the common law and the civil law traditions. The source of
the requirement, however, differs. In the civil law tradition, obligations
may arise from a variety of sources, including contracts, declarations of
will, and directly from the law.56 Regardless of the source of an obligation,
“[g]ood faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor and the obligee.”57
This overarching rule of good faith applies to mandataries, tutors, curators,
succession representatives, and trustees.
a. Mandataries
The Louisiana contract of mandate has much in common with its
Roman law ancestor. The mandatary is obligated to act “with prudence
and diligence” with respect to “the mandate he has accepted” and is
generally prohibited from self-dealing.58 The mandatary “is bound to
deliver to the principal everything he received by virtue of the mandate”
and is usually “bound to account for his performance to the principal.”59
b. Tutors and Curators
The Louisiana tutor and curator also have much in common with their
Roman counterparts. The tutor and curator are bound to act as “prudent
administrator[s]” of the property under their care and are liable for failure to
do so.60 Self-dealing is either prohibited or carefully regulated.61 As in the
Roman era, additional safeguards further protect the minor or interdict,
including the requirement of security and taking of an inventory, periodic
reporting obligations, and court supervision.62 Grounds for disqualification
from serving as tutor or curator are clearly inspired by the Roman tradition.
A person who is incapable of prudent administration or who is not
trustworthy is disqualified from serving as tutor or curator. Minors,
interdicts, and persons who are “proved to be mentally incompetent” or
otherwise unfit or incapable due to mental or physical condition are
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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disqualified.63 A person may also be disqualified because he lacks
trustworthiness. Various conflicts of interest—such as being the minor’s or
the interdict’s debtor or being an adverse party in litigation—will preclude
appointment.64 Convicted felons and persons who are unfit for
appointment because of “bad moral character” are likewise disqualified.65
Roman roots are likewise evident in the laws governing removal and
malfeasance. Removal is appropriate if the tutor or curator has
mismanaged the property under his care or “has failed to perform any duty
imposed by law or by order of court.”66 Removal is also allowed for any
other good cause, including disqualification and lack of capability of the
tutor or curator.67
c. Succession Representatives
Louisiana holds succession representatives to a fiduciary-like standard.
Many of the Louisiana laws governing succession representatives are based
on tutorship and curatorship laws. This is appropriate because the
contemporary succession representative serves many similar functions in
administering the succession as a tutor or curator serves in administering
property. It is also appropriate that the succession representative—like the
tutor and curator—is more closely regulated by the court than the
mandatary. Unlike the mandatary, the succession representative is not
usually selected by the people whose interests he represents, and they are
usually unable to remove him at will.
The succession representative “is a fiduciary with respect to the
succession” who is held to the same “prudent administrator” standard to
which mandataries, tutors, and curators are held.68 Self-dealing, although
sometimes allowed out of necessity, is closely regulated.69 Additional
safeguards—such as the requirements of security, inventory, accounting
obligations, and court supervision—help ensure that the succession
representative does not take advantage of his office.70 The laws governing
who is qualified to serve as a succession representative are nearly identical
to those pertaining to tutors and curators.71 Succession representatives, like
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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tutors and curators, face civil and criminal penalties for malfeasance and
may be removed from office. The grounds for removal of a succession
representative are essentially the same as those for removal of a tutor or
curator.72
d. Trustees
Louisiana also allows the creation of express trusts comparable to
those allowed in common law. Some aspects of the common law trust are
at odds with traditional civilian thinking and continue to pose theoretical
and practical challenges.73 The obligations of the trustee to act as a
fiduciary, however, should not pose the same challenges. Although
inspired by common law, the Louisiana trustee’s fiduciary role is best
understood by reference to other comparable civilian concepts, namely
mandate, tutorship, curatorship, and the administration of successions.74
Like other Louisiana fiduciaries, the trustee is bound to administer the
property under his care “as a prudent person would administer it,” and he
is generally liable under the law of obligations, rather than delict, for his
failure to do so.75 Self-dealing is either prohibited or closely regulated, as
in the case of other Louisiana fiduciaries.76 Additional safeguards protect
the interest of the beneficiaries, such as the requirements of security,
accounting reporting obligations, and the possible intervention and
oversight by the courts.77 Not everyone is qualified to serve as a trustee,
and trustees may be removed for many of the same reasons that tutors,
curators, and succession representatives may be removed.78

72. See id. arts. 3182, 3396.20.
73. See generally Scalise, supra note 6; Wisdom, supra note 6.
74. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1, 2, 10, 13 (2013); Vuskovich v. Thorne,
498 So. 2d 1072, 1078 (La. 1986) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fiduciary
relationship created by a trust is no different from the relationship of an
administrator or executor to the heir or legatee, of a curator to an interdict, of a
tutor to a minor . . . or from the relationship created by the fiducie of French law,
derived from the Roman law.”); see also John B. Claxton, The Fondé de Pouvoir
for Holders of Secured Indebtedness: Article 2692 Revisited, A Critical
Examination, 44 MCGILL L.J. 665, 702–03 (1999).
75. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2090 (2018). At least one court has suggested that the
trustee has a higher fiduciary standard than a succession representative. See
Albritton v. Albritton, 622 So. 2d 709, 713 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
76. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2083–86.
77. See, e.g., id. §§ 9:2064–68, 9:2088–89, 9:2171–73.
78. See id. §§ 9:1783, 1789; see also infra Part IV.
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3. Confusion in Louisiana Courts
Louisiana courts have often cited common law sources and definitions
to explain fiduciary relationships.79 When the law in question stems from
common law rather than civil law, reliance on common law authority
makes some sense. For example, Louisiana derives much of its public law
and criminal law from the common law tradition.80 The regulation of the
legal profession in Louisiana is likewise based on the approach in other
American states.81 Cases involving these issues might appropriately look
to the common law when necessary. Problems arise, however, when courts
continue to look to common law authority for matters clearly governed by
Louisiana’s private civil law.
Plaquemines Parish Commission Council v. Delta Development Co.,
Inc., and its progeny provide a useful illustration of this problem.82 The
case involved a variety of bad acts by Leander Perez, Sr., and his two sons,
Leander, Jr., and Chalin. The Plaquemines Parish Commission Council
“alleged that the three ‘public official’ Perezes, Leander Perez, Sr., Chalin
Perez and Leander Perez, Jr., wrongfully secured and retained personal
interests in publicly owned mineral lands through breaches of their
fiduciary duties as public officials and as attorneys.”83 The fiduciary duties
in question did not stem from Louisiana’s private law or from the civil law
tradition. Rather, the Perezes’ fiduciary duties stemmed from their
positions as government attorneys and public officials. In describing these
duties, the Court looked to a variety of common law sources, particularly
decisions from other state and federal courts.84 For example, the Court
relied on decisions from California, Minnesota, and Texas for the
following proposition:
A fiduciary relationship has been further described as one that
exists “when confidence is reposed on one side and there is
resulting superiority and influence on the other.” The duty
79. See, e.g., Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502
So. 2d 1034, 1040 (La. 1987); Scheffler v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 950 So. 2d 641,
647 (La. 2007).
80. See Robert R. Peebles, Jr., Governmental Tort Liability in Louisiana: A
Response to Professor Robertson and a Call for More Study, 65 TUL. L. REV.
1055, 1083–84 (1991); Ilijana Tdorovic, The Uniqueness of Louisiana’s Legal
Heritage: A Historical Perspective, 65 LA. B.J. 378, 380 (2018).
81. See, e.g., Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d at 1041.
82. Id. at 1034.
83. Id. at 1036.
84. Id. at 1036–38.
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imposed on a fiduciary embraces the obligation to render a full
and fair disclosure to the beneficiary of all facts which materially
affect his rights and interests. Relative to the duty of disclosure
flowing from the fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary’s duty to
disclose has been held paramount to the beneficiary’s duty to
investigate possible conflicts of interest.85
This is a fairly typical articulation of common law fiduciary duty and one
that made some sense, given the public law nature of the case.
That articulation, however, is inappropriate in a private law context in
Louisiana. It suggests that a great many individuals might be subjected to
fiduciary standards and liability where they otherwise would have no legal
obligation to act as a fiduciary. In other words, it suggests that fiduciary
obligations might arise by law and by the facts of a particular case. Yet
civil law does not generally recognize fiduciary relationships that arise
merely by fact. The Court’s description wholly ignores the law of
obligations and its nearly exclusive role in defining the scope and
existence of fiduciary obligations in Louisiana. Indeed, Louisiana
jurisprudence contains countless examples of courts that both repeat this
common law explanation of what it means to be a fiduciary and misapply
it in the private law context. In so doing, courts too often ignore or
downplay the actual Louisiana law on point.86 This approach has also led
to considerable confusion on questions relating to prescription.87 Even
where the ultimate conclusions are consistent with Louisiana law, the
rationales are worrisome.

85. Id. at 1040–41.
86. E.g., Succession of McKinley, 206 So. 3d 959, 966–68 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2016) (relying heavily on the common law articulation to explain breach of
fiduciary duty under a general mandate in the estate planning setting while largely
ignoring the applicable Louisiana Civil Code articles); Sampson v. DCI of
Alexandria, 970 So. 2d. 55, 59–61 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2007) (using the common
law articulation to explain the contract of mandate and its accompanying
obligations while largely ignoring the applicable Louisiana Civil Code articles);
Wadsworth v. ABC Ins. Co., 732 So. 2d 56, 58 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1998)
(refusing to extend the Delta Development case definition of fiduciary to a
personal relationship on the theory that Delta Development applied to commercial
situations; failing to recognize that Delta Development was a public law case);
Kaplan v. Fine, 643 So. 2d 438, 440 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994) (correctly holding
that woman’s social position and friendship with a couple did not make her a
fiduciary with respect to their business investments but failing to apply the
applicable Louisiana law).
87. See infra Section II.F.
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II. MANDATARIES
If a mandatary breaches his fiduciary obligations, Louisiana
contemplates two methods by which recourse may be sought: the direct
action and the action to review.88 Each is considered in more detail below.
The direct action refers to the traditional remedies available for
mandatary malfeasance. Generally, the principal can sue the mandatary
directly for breach of the mandatary’s fiduciary duty. If the principal fails
to bring suit against the mandatary prior to the principal’s death, then the
principal’s successors may bring suit following the principal’s death. In
either case, the right to bring suit is tied to the fiduciary relationship. The
principal can sue because he is the obligee in the contract of mandate.
Following the principal’s death, his successors can bring suit because
economic harm to the obligee also harms their interests in his estate.
The action to review is different. It is the result of a 2016 legislative
enactment that was derived from § 116 of the Uniform Power of Attorney
Act and, as a result, does not fit perfectly in Louisiana law.89 Generally,
the action to review grants various interested parties, other than the
principal, the right to bring an action during the life of the principal to
review the mandatary’s actions.90 The action to review is intended to serve
more of a prophylactic function. As discussed in more detail below, the
action brings the law of mandate and the law of interdiction into closer
alignment by facilitating court review of a mandatary’s actions prior to the
death of the principal.
A. Parties to Litigation Against a Mandatary
As a fundamental matter, the principal is a proper party to bring suit
against his mandatary, and the mandatary is the proper defendant. More
practically, the principal may be unwilling or unable to bring suit if the
principal is being abused or lacks the requisite mental capacity to
recognize mandatary malfeasance. Mandatary malfeasance sometimes
does not come to light until after the death of the principal or the
mandatary. The following section considers these more nuanced issues as
applied to both the direct action and the action to review.

88. These actions have not previously been assigned specific names. I name
them here in the interest of clarity.
89. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:3851–54 (2018) and accompanying comments.
90. Id. §§ 9:3851–54.
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1. Direct Action
a. Plaintiff
The principal is the proper party to bring suit against the mandatary
for malfeasance because the principal and the mandatary are the parties to
the contract that was breached.91 If the principal is interdicted, then his
curator or other legal representative is the proper party to bring suit.92
Sometimes, a mandatary’s malfeasance does not come to light until after
the death of the principal. In such cases, the principal’s successors will
want to bring suit against the mandatary, and Louisiana law generally
allows them to do so.93 The proper parties and procedure depend, in part,
on whether the principal’s succession is under administration. If the
succession is under administration, then the succession representative is
the proper party to bring suit against the mandatary.94 If the principal’s
succession is not under administration, then the heirs or legatees of the
principal are the proper plaintiffs to bring suit against the mandatary.95 The
principal’s creditors might also have standing in some circumstances.
A deceased principal’s succession might not be under administration
for one of two reasons: (1) it has not yet been opened; or (2) it has already
been concluded. If the succession has not been opened, then a presumptive
heir is a proper party to bring suit.96 A creditor of the decedent might also
have standing to bring suit in some circumstances. If the succession has
already been closed, then the parties recognized as heirs or legatees in a
judgment of possession are usually the proper parties to bring suit. They
might do so by seeking to reopen the succession or through a direct suit
against the mandatary.97 If the decedent’s property was left in trust, then
the trustee is also a proper party to bring suit to protect the rights of the
beneficiaries.98

91. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 681 (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided by
law, an action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest
which he asserts.”).
92. See id. arts. 684, 694.
93. See In re Succession of Twine, 54 So. 3d 71, 72 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2010).
94. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 685.
95. Id. art. 426.
96. See Woodard v. Upp, 142 So. 3d. 14, 19 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2014). A
presumptive legatee might also have standing in some circumstances.
97. See In re Succession of Twine, 54 So. 3d at 72.
98. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 699.
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b. Defendant
The mandatary is the proper party to be named as defendant in a suit
relating to his inadequate performance or breach. If the mandatary is
deceased, interdicted, or under other legal disability, then the action ought
to name his successors, curator, or legal representative.99 The Louisiana
Civil Code sets forth rules of liability when the mandatary appoints a
substitute and for liability among multiple mandataries.100 If relevant,
these individuals should also be named as defendants.
c. Dual Appointments and Conflicts of Interest
Difficulties can arise when the person who served as mandatary also
serves in another fiduciary position. Estate planning clients routinely
select the same person to act as mandatary under a so-called “durable
power of attorney” and to serve as executor. Overlap is also common in
the case of trustees and executors. Although dual appointments have a
number of advantages, they sometimes make it easier for malfeasance to
go unnoticed and unchecked. For example, if the mandatary causes harm
to the principal, then the principal’s succession representative is generally
obligated to pursue any necessary claims against the mandatary following
the principal’s death.101 Moreover, the succession representative is usually
the only party with standing to bring such a claim while the succession is
under administration.102
A significant problem arises when the succession representative and
the mandatary are, in fact, the same person. The succession representative
is obviously unlikely to bring his prior bad acts to light or to bring an action
against himself. The law does, however, offer relief to aggrieved heirs,
legatees, and creditors in these circumstances. The aggrieved party should
bring suit in the succession to simultaneously seek the removal of the
succession representative and redress of the succession representative’s
prior malfeasance while he served as mandatary. Louisiana clearly allows
such actions,103 and they are discussed in more depth below.104

99. See id. arts. 733, 734.
100. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3007, 3009 (2018).
101. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3211.
102. See id. art. 685.
103. E.g., Succession of Grander v. Worthington, 829 So. 2d 1108, 1109–10
(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2002).
104. See infra Section III.E.
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2. Action to Review
The action to review helps to address a recurring practical problem:
the gap between mandate and interdiction. A client might execute a broad
“durable” mandate as part of his overall estate plan. “Durability,” a term
borrowed from common law, means that the authority of the mandatary
survives the incapacity—but not the interdiction—of the principal. One
purpose of durable power of attorney, or mandate, is to avoid the
embarrassment and loss of privacy that results from interdiction
proceedings. A durable mandate can often accomplish this goal and enable
the mandatary to handle the principal’s financial affairs, medical
decisions, and general well-being without going through any court process
or supervision. Sometimes that arrangement works well; sometimes it does
not.
Prior to Louisiana’s 2016 enactment of the action to review, the
incapacitated—but not interdicted—principal had little protection against
abuse by his mandatary under a durable mandate. A principal with a
significantly diminished mental or physical condition can hardly be
expected to terminate the mandate and seek recourse against his mandatary
through the direct action. The same is true if the mandatary is abusing the
principal. Previously, the principal’s friends, relatives, and caregivers had
few legal options if they suspected malfeasance or abuse by a
mandatary.105 If the principal was unwilling or unable to sue the mandatary
via the direct action, concerned onlookers had no immediate legal
recourse.
Concerned onlookers do, however, have legal recourse in the
interdiction setting. Because the interdict is, by definition, unable to
adequately monitor the actions of his curator, any interested party has
standing to bring suspected malfeasance to the attention of the court.106
The court can also raise the issue on its own.107 Roman law took a similar

105. Absent cooperation from the principal or the mandatary, concerned
parties had to wait until a direct action could be brought by someone other than
the principal. This usually meant waiting until the durable mandate terminated. A
durable mandate terminates at the death or interdiction of either the mandatary or
the principal. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3024. From a practical standpoint, death or
interdiction of the principal is the more likely solution. Following the principal’s
interdiction, his curator could bring a direct action against the mandatary.
Similarly, following the principal’s death, his heirs or his succession
representative could bring a direct action against the mandatary.
106. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 4234, 4568.
107. Id.
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approach.108 Not only were many individuals allowed to bring curator or
tutor malfeasance to the attention of the Praetor, but it was also a moral
obligation to do so.109 Following in that Roman spirit, Louisiana takes a
broad view of who may bring suspected curator or tutor malfeasance to
the attention of the court.110
The action to review brings the contract of mandate closer to
interdiction in some circumstances. It allows a party other than the
mandatary to bring an action “on behalf of the principal to review the acts
of the principal’s mandatary” and to seek relief on the principal’s behalf.111
a. Plaintiff
Following the Roman philosophy, courts should take a liberal view of
standing in actions to review. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3851 sets
forth a broad, if sometimes confusing, class of potential plaintiffs in the
action to review: “A person authorized to make healthcare decisions for
the principal” is a permissible plaintiff.112 This class includes any person
named as an agent for healthcare decisions under Civil Code article
2997(6) and any person who has authority to make medical decisions for
another person under Louisiana’s medical consent law.113 Permitted to
bring the action are a “spouse, a parent, or a descendant of the principal,”
as well as a “presumptive heir or legatee of the principal.”114 A
presumptive heir is someone who stands to inherit from another in
intestacy.115 The reference to “legatee” likely means that any person
named as a legatee in an existing will executed by the principal can bring
the action. This provision is somewhat unusual. Because wills are
ambulatory and subject to revocation prior to the death of the testator, they
do not usually confer rights on legatees until the time of the testator’s
108. See supra Section I.B.1.
109. See supra Section I.B.1.
110. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 4234, 4568 (allowing removal of
tutors and curators by the court on its own motion or by motion of any interested
party); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1025 (2018) (allowing actions for removal to be
brought by a spouse, relative, interested party, and various nonprofit
organizations); In re McCauley, 257 So. 3d 255 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2018)
(allowing college that was named defendant in lawsuit to seek removal of tutor).
111. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3851 (Supp. 2018).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 40:1159.4.
114. Id. § 9:3851.
115. See Kathryn V. Lorio, Successions & Donations, in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE § 2:2 (2d ed. 2018).
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death. The action to review is an exception to that rule insofar as it confers
standing on a presumptive legatee prior to the death of the testator. The
action to review continues this exception with respect to non-probate
transfers. Anyone who is “named as a beneficiary to receive any real or
personal right upon the death of the principal” may bring the action to
review.116 In addition to heirs and legatees, this class might include
someone named as the beneficiary of a life insurance contract, retirement
account, or other non-probate asset. It might also include a person who
holds property as a joint tenant with right of survivorship or similar
designation in a jurisdiction that recognizes such forms of title. Also
permitted to bring the action are a “trustee or beneficiary of an inter vivos
or testamentary trust created by or for the principal.”117
Finally, the action to review confers standing on two groups of people
not otherwise recognized by Louisiana law. First, a “caregiver of the
principal” is authorized to bring the action to review.118 “Caregiver” is not
a term found elsewhere in Louisiana law. Second, “[a]ny other person with
sufficient interest in the welfare of the principal” may bring the action.
Again, this standard is not used elsewhere in Louisiana law.119 In any case,
the obvious intent of the statutory regime is to confer standing rather than
to deny it. If standing to bring the action to review is doubtful, the court
should normally decide in favor of standing.
b. Defendant
The action to review also has a somewhat different rule regarding
defendants than the direct action. In the case of the action to review, “[t]he
petition shall be verified and shall name as defendants the principal, the
mandatary, and any other person against whom relief is sought.”120 The
action to review also requires personal service on the principal—service
on the mandatary alone is insufficient.121

116. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3851.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. An analogy could be made to the “adult friend” described in
Louisiana’s medical consent law. Id. § 40:1159.4.
120. Id. § 9:3851.
121. Id.
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c. Timing Issues: Distinguishing Between the Direct Action and the
Action to Review
Unlike the direct action, the action to review cannot be brought after
the death or interdiction of the principal. The contract of mandate
automatically terminates at death or interdiction of either the principal or
the mandatary, thus precluding any review of the actions of an acting
mandatary.122 Rather, after the termination of the mandate due to death or
interdiction, the principal’s curator, successors, substitute mandatary, or
succession representative may bring a direct action against the mandatary.
A more challenging question arises if the principal dies during the
pendency of an action to review: Can the action to review continue, does
death of the principal terminate the action, or can the action to review be
converted to a direct action? This question is important for prescription
purposes and because the procedures and remedies available under the two
actions differ in several respects. Unfortunately, the current statutory
regime does little to offer clarity. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3853
simply provides: “Upon the interdiction or death of the principal, the court
shall allow a curator with appropriate authority or the principal’s legal
successor to be substituted for the plaintiff.” Taken alone, this language
might suggest that the action to review continues after the death or
interdiction of the principal. When read in context, however, it should be
clear that the death or interdiction of the principal causes the action to
review to automatically convert to a direct action. The substituted plaintiff
can then decide to pursue or abandon the direct action. If he decides to
continue with the direct action, then the procedures and remedies are the
same as any other direct action.
B. Venue
Venue is a thorny question in suits against mandataries. As explained
below, a plaintiff in the direct action must be careful when pleading venue
to avoid prescription issues. The action to review has a distinct set of rules
relating to venue that differ from those in the direct action.
1. Direct Action
Several venue options may exist in actions against mandataries.
Contract venue is appropriate in most actions involving mandataries
because mandate is, of course, a contract. Louisiana Code of Civil
122. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3024 (2018).
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Procedure article 76.1 provides that “[a]n action on a contract may be
brought . . . where any work or service was performed or was to be
performed under the terms of the contract.”123 Mandatary malfeasance can
sometimes have tort elements that could support an alternative venue
rule.124 Actions against mandataries based on tort theories, however, often
have unfavorable rules of prescription, as is explained in more detail
below.125 For that reason, the plaintiff probably should not rely solely on
a tort theory for venue purposes.
Venue might also be established under the more general rules relating
to the defendant’s residence or domicile.126 If the action against the
mandatary involves immovable property, then the rules of Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 80 may apply. Of particular interest, the article
requires that an “action to revoke a donation of immovable property . . . be
brought in the parish in which the property is located.”127 Finally, if the
direct action is brought as part of a related action against a trustee or
succession representative, then the venue rules applicable to trusts and
successions will generally trump the more permissive tort and contract
venue rules.128
2. Action to Review
Venue for an action to review is more straightforward—it is based on
the domicile or residence of the principal.129 If the principal has neither a
domicile nor a residence in Louisiana, then venue is proper where “the
principal is physically present or where immovable property of the
principal is located.”130
C. Types of Proceedings and Related Issues
Many actions relating to mandataries must be brought as ordinary
proceedings.131 Actions seeking damages or some other remedy against
the mandatary usually arise from contract theories and, as such, are treated

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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Id. art 80(D).
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Id. § 9:3851.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3851 cmt. i (2018).

8/17/20 7:18 AM

2020]

FIDUCIARY LITIGATION IN LOUISIANA

685

as any other lawsuit. In some instances, a party may seek injunctive relief,
in which case the rules pertaining to injunctive relief will apply.
The action to review has some heightened pleading requirements. The
petition must be a verified petition, and it “shall state with particularity the
facts establishing the petitioner’s right to bring the action, the reasons that
a review of the acts of the mandatary is needed, and the relief sought.”132
D. Remedies Available: Direct Action
A variety of remedies are available to redress a breach of fiduciary
obligation or other improper action by a mandatary via direct action. The
principal, or his successors, may demand an accounting, demand a return
of the principal’s property, seek money damages, seek interest, and seek
various forms of incidental and injunctive relief.
1. Burden of Proof
Many remedies require the plaintiff to first show that the mandatary
breached his fiduciary obligations. Jurisprudence makes it clear that the
initial burden rests with the plaintiff: “In order to prove breach of a
fiduciary duty, the claimant must show that the party acted fraudulently,
breached the trust bestowed upon him, or took actions that exceeded those
granted to him.”133
2. Injunctive Relief
In theory, the principal can seek injunctive relief against a mandatary.
In reality, injunctive relief will rarely be an appropriate remedy for the
direct action: “Injunction is an extraordinary remedy and should only issue
where the party seeking it is threatened with irreparable loss without
adequate remedy at law.”134 This standard presents two major obstacles to
injunctive relief against a mandatary. First, injuries that may be
compensated by money damages do not usually constitute irreparable
harm under Louisiana law.135 A breach of fiduciary obligation by a
132. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3851(B).
133. In re Succession of McKinley, 206 So. 3d 959, 967 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2016).
134. Accord Licfro, Inc. v. State, 859 So. 2d 739, 742 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2003).
135. E.g., Metro Riverboat Assoc., Inc. v. Bally’s Louisiana, Inc. 789 So. 2d
565, 566 (La. 2001); Terrebonne Parish Police Jury v. Matherne, 405 So. 2d 314,
319 (La. 1981).
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mandatary is often susceptible to pecuniary valuation, thus precluding
injunctive relief. Second, a principal who is unhappy with his mandatary
can simply terminate the mandate, which is a much simpler remedy than
seeking an injunction.136 The ability of the principal to terminate the
mandate is usually a sufficient remedy at law.
Louisiana recognizes a handful of exceptions to the irreparable harm
requirement which are discussed in more detail below. Injunctive relief is,
however, clearly appropriate in one circumstance: where the mandatary is
using his power to isolate the principal.137 Civil Code article 2995
provides, in relevant part:
A mandatary shall not prevent or limit reasonable communication,
visitation, or interaction between a principal who is over the age
of eighteen years and another person without prior court approval,
to be granted only upon a showing of good cause by the
mandatary, unless express authority has been provided pursuant
to Article 2997(7).
The Code of Civil Procedure, in turn, makes it clear that injunctive relief
is appropriate in cases of isolation. Article 3601 states that “irreparable
injury, loss or damage . . . may result from the isolation of an individual
over the age of eighteen years by any other individual, curator, or
mandatary . . . .”138 Taken together, the language in Civil Code article 2995
and Code of Civil Procedure article 3601 suggests that certain third parties
have a right of action to seek visitation with the principal. Unfortunately,
the mechanics of such an action are unclear, and the implemented
legislation leaves much to be desired.139
3. Demanding an Accounting
At least two Civil Code articles reference the mandatary’s accounting
obligation. Article 3003 provides that “the mandatary is bound to provide
information and render an account of his performance of the mandate”
whenever the principal so requests or “when the circumstances so require.”
136. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3025 (2018).
137. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3601 (2018).
138. Id. art. 3601(E).
139. Act 110 of the 2016 Legislative Session made several changes to the law
aimed at addressing the isolation and visitation of older adults, including the
language relating to mandataries. That same act expressly created a cause of
action for visitation with an interdict and set out applicable rules of procedure.
See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 4570. Perhaps that action should apply by analogy.
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Article 3032 provides: “Upon termination of the mandate, unless this
obligation has been expressly dispensed with, the mandatary is bound to
account for his performance to the principal.”
The principal may demand an accounting himself. An accounting may
also be demanded by a curator following the principal’s interdiction. Heirs
and legatees may demand an accounting following the principal’s death.
This remedy is useful when the heirs and legatees suspect—but cannot yet
prove—that a mandatary acted improperly with respect to a decedent’s
assets. The demand for an accounting serves a number of strategic
litigation functions, some of which are discussed in more detail in the
sections pertaining to succession representatives and trustees.
As a matter of courtesy, it is customary in most cases to ask the
mandatary for an accounting prior to actually filing a suit. Obviously, this
request should be made in writing and adequately documented. If, or
when, the mandatary refuses to comply, is unresponsive, or offers a
deficient accounting, filing suit is appropriate. Certain factual scenarios,
including considerations of prescription, may dictate a more aggressive
course of action.
4. Demanding the Return of Property
Civil Code article 3004 requires the mandatary “to deliver to the
principal everything he received by virtue of the mandate, including things
he received unduly.” This article requires the mandatary to return any
property that the mandatary applied for his own use without the
authorization of the principal. Damages under this part of article 3004
generally take the form of restitution damages. For example, if the
mandatary makes gratuitous gifts to himself of the principal’s property
without the authorization to do so, then the court should order the
mandatary to return the property, or its value, to the principal.140
The mandatary is generally prohibited from seeking to deal on his own
account for his own benefit: “He may not speculate for his gain in the
subject-matter of his employment.”141 As result, article 3004 also requires
the mandatary to turn over “things he received unduly” to the principal.
Damages under this part of article 3004 generally take the form of

140. E.g., Levy v. Levy, 829 So. 2d 640, 649 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002)
(noting that the trial court was correct to conclude that the mandatary was required
to restore assets he converted for his own personal use).
141. Woodward v. Steed, 680 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1996)
(citing Neal v. Daniels, 47 So. 2d 44, 45 (La. 1950)).
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disgorgement or lost profits.142 As illustrated by Woodward v. Steed,143
these are useful remedies in appropriate cases. Woodward left the state for
a lengthy period of time to pursue gender affirmation surgery.144 He left
his neighbor and friend, Steed, in charge of his affairs and instructed Steed
to find buyers for a parcel of property that Woodward owned.145 Steed
convinced Woodward to sell the property to him.146 Meanwhile, without
informing Woodward, Steed struck a deal with a casino to turn around and
sell the property to the casino for significantly more money than he paid
to Woodward.147 The court found that Steed breached his obligations as
mandatary by using “his position to act contrary to, or to the detriment of,
Woodward’s interests.”148 The court described this as “a classical conflict
of interest contemplated in the Civil Code and case law” and ordered Steed
“to account for and restore to C.K. Woodward the profits derived from
Steed’s breach of his fiduciary duty to Woodward.”149
5. Money Damages
Under article 3004, pecuniary damages may take the form of
reimbursement, disgorgement, lost profits, or all three. Other types of
money damages are also contemplated by the Civil Code. The principal
may recover damages for a variety of reasons, but two common examples
in the estate planning setting involve a mandatary who exceeds the scope
of his authority and a mandatary who self-deals without proper
authorization.150
The Civil Code offers helpful guidance for determining the
appropriate measure of damages. Article 3001, for example, provides that
the mandatary is “responsible to the principal for the loss that the principal
142. E.g., Norwood v. Mobley Valve Servs., 144 So. 3d 1143, 1149 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 2014) (requiring defendants to pay over a portion of profits derived
from a sale that was done in breach of their fiduciary duties).
143. Woodward, 680 So. 2d 1320.
144. Id. at 1322.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1326.
149. Id. at 1326, 1327.
150. See, e.g., Baxter v. Lewis, 247 So. 3d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018)
(alleging fraud and self-dealing by mandatary prior to death of principal); In re
Succession of McKinley, 206 So. 3d 959, 968 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2016) (finding
mandatary engaged in self-dealing and exceeded scope of his authority); Levy v.
Levy, 829 So. 2d 640, 642–43 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002) (mandatary made gifts
to himself and his wife from principals’ property without authorization to do so).
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sustains as a result of the mandatary’s failure to perform.” Similarly,
article 3008 provides that “[i]f the mandatary exceeds his authority, he is
answerable to the principal for resulting loss that the principal sustains.”
Louisiana courts have not had sufficient opportunity to consider articles
3001 and 3008 in the estate planning context. The jurisprudence, however,
contains ample examples of these damages in other contexts that may
make useful comparisons.151
6. Interest
All types of suits for money damages may seek interest awards. The
availability and rate of interest is not usually controversial. Louisiana law
is clear that “[t]he court shall award interest in the judgment” if it is prayed
for or otherwise authorized by law.152 Interest is awarded at the legal
rate.153 The tricky issue is determining exactly when interest begins to
accrue. The date on which interest should commence depends on the facts
and circumstances. Generally, interest on tort judgments “shall attach from
date of judicial demand.”154 Contract damages have varying rules, some of
which allow for interest to commence at an earlier date. For instance,
“[w]hen the object of the performance is a sum of money, damages for
delay in performance are measured by the interest on that sum from the
time it is due.”155
Mandatary malfeasance in the estate planning context often involves
the mandatary using the principal’s property for his personal use without
authorization from the principal. As discussed above, the mandatary can
be ordered to reimburse the principal or his estate for misappropriated
funds. Additional damages in the form of interest are also available in such
cases. Civil Code article 3005 provides that “[t]he mandatary owes
interest, from the date used, on sums of money of the principal that the
mandatary applies to his own use.”156 In such cases, it is irrelevant whether
the conduct sounds in tort or contract—interest begins to accrue from the
date the mandatary used the money.
151. See, e.g., Sampson v. DCI of Alexandria, 960 So. 2d 55, 59 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 2007) (failure to procure insurance policy); Huval v. Offshore Pipelines,
86 F.3d 454, 459 (5th Cir. 1996) (failure to procure proper insurance).
152. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1921 (2018).
153. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4202 (2018).
154. Id. § 13:4203. But see Farrar v. Whaley, 211 So. 3d 449, 461 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 2017) (holding that “interest on damages for conversion is usually awarded
from the day of conversion”).
155. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2000 (2018).
156. Id. art. 3005 (emphasis added).
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7. Defenses of Mandatary
Some unique defenses are available to the mandatary. A mandatary
may attempt to mitigate the extent of money damages he owes by seeking
reimbursement for fees and other expenses.157 Additionally, the mandatary
might seek relief under Civil Code article 3002 if the mandate is
gratuitous, as is the case with many mandates in the estate planning setting.
Article 3002 grants courts the discretion to “reduce the amount of loss for
which the mandatary is liable” if the mandate is gratuitous. Only a handful
of reported decisions have addressed this issue, and they have largely
concerned commercial transactions in which the relationships involved
were quite different than those seen in the estate planning context. Given
the very real harms that accompany abuse by mandataries in the estate
planning setting, courts should be hesitant to grant relief to the mandatary
under article 3002 absent significant mitigating circumstances.
E. Remedies Available: Action to Review
The remedies available in the action to review differ in some important
respects from the remedies available in the direct action. In some cases,
the differences are quite logical in light of the differing interests served by
the two actions. In other cases, the action to review ostensibly permits
remedies that may be at odds with more general Louisiana legal principles.
1. Burden of Proof
The action to review has a unique standard for decision-making.
Courts are directed to “consider the mandate” and permitted to “consider
any other relevant factors.”158 Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3854 sets
forth a non-exclusive list of relevant factors as follows:
(1) The expressed wishes of the principal.
(2) The known or reasonable expectations of the principal.
(3) The best interests of the principal.
(4) Any will, trust, or beneficiary designation executed by the
principal.
(5) The principal’s history or pattern of donations inter vivos.
(6) Physical, financial, or psychological abuse of the principal.
(7) Fraud, duress, or undue influence.
(8) The principal’s regular contact with family and friends other
157. See Levy v. Levy, 829 So. 2d 640, 649 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002).
158. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3854.
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than the mandatary.
(9) The ability of the principal to comprehend generally the nature
and consequences of the acts of the mandatary.
(10) The donee’s knowledge or imputed knowledge that a
donation was not for the benefit or gratification of the
principal.
(11) The good or bad faith of a defendant.159
These factors, which were imported from the Uniform Power of Attorney
Act, are clearly aimed at protecting the well-being of the principal and
preventing various forms of elder abuse.
2. Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief is available in the action to review. While the action
is pending, the court is permitted to “[e]njoin the mandatary from
exercising all or some of the powers granted by the mandate during the
pendency of the action.”160 In other words, the court is permitted to issue
a temporary suspension of the mandatary’s authority pending a hearing.
Injunctive relief may also be ordered by the court after a hearing as part of
its ultimate resolution of the case.161
Interestingly, injunctive relief is more readily available in the action
to review than in the direct action. Injunctive relief is available in the
action to review without a showing of irreparable injury.162 As a result, the
third party challenging the acts of the mandatary has greater rights than
the principal has in his own right. A principal, however, is usually free to
simply terminate the mandate at any time without the necessity of an
injunction or court proceeding, which is a simple remedy not available to
a third party.163
3. Remedies During Pendency of the Proceeding
In addition to injunctive relief, a variety of remedies are available
during the pendency of the action to review. The court may, for example,
order an accounting and order discovery on its own motion.164 The court
may “[o]rder, without first holding a contradictory hearing, a financial
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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institution, a healthcare provider, or any other person to provide the
financial, medical, or other information of any defendant to the action.”165
The comments of the Revised Statutes point out that this is a departure
from other provisions of law that would ordinarily require a hearing prior
to ordering the disclosure of such confidential information.166
Jurisprudence in other settings demonstrates how this information might
be useful to the court and to the litigants.167
The court is permitted to “[a]ppoint a qualified person to investigate
the allegations of the petition and to report the findings.”168 The statute
provides no guidance on who the court should appoint to conduct such an
investigation. Jurisprudence in other settings demonstrates what types of
persons the court might consider appointing. For example, forensic
accountants are often called upon to review financial records and to
determine whether financial wrongdoing occurred.169 Similarly, doctors,
nurses, psychologists, and social workers are often called upon to review
records and conduct interviews or examinations related to physical health,
mental health, physical abuse, and sexual abuse.170
The court may “[a]ppoint a person to exercise some or all of the
authority granted by the mandate . . . if there is no successor or substitute
mandatary named in the mandate who is able or willing to serve, or if no
law otherwise provides a person to act.”171 Other Louisiana laws that
165. Id. § 9:3854(B)(2).
166. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3854 cmt. c (2018).
167. See, e.g., G.N.S. v. S.B.S., 796 So. 2d 739, 742 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
2001) (medical records from emergency room visit provided evidence of child
abuse); In re Dumas, 187 So. 3d 428, 431 (La. 2016) (bank statements and other
documents showed evidence that attorney mishandled funds).
168. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3854(B)(3).
169. See, e.g., State ex rel. P.B. v. Reed, 197 So. 3d 817, 821 (La. Ct. App. 5th
Cir. 2016) (court appointed a forensic accountant to review father’s financial
circumstances in child support case); Dumas, 187 So. 3d at 431 (bank statements
and other documents showed evidence that attorney mishandled funds).
170. See, e.g., McIntosh v. McIntosh, 768 So. 2d 219, 220–22 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 2000) (court “appointed E.H. Baker, Ph.D., to conduct psychological
evaluations of the parents and children”); State v. Adams, 78 So. 3d 222 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 2011) (Experts were called upon to determine whether the death of
an elderly man resulted from being harmed by another person or accidental injury.
The testimony included a forensic pathologist, a forensic anthropologist, and a
physician who was an expert in geriatrics, elder abuse, and osteoporosis.); State
v. Smith, 870 So. 2d 618, 622 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2004) (observations of
psychiatrist, social workers, and others relevant in determining whether elderly
woman had been abused).
171. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3854(B)(6).

344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd 36

8/17/20 7:18 AM

2020]

FIDUCIARY LITIGATION IN LOUISIANA

693

would “provide a person to act” include medical consent laws, with respect
to medical treatment,172 curator and interdiction laws,173 and laws
governing the management of community property.174 In the absence of an
existing person empowered to act, the court can appoint a curator-like
person without the type of hearing or process required for interdiction.
This is a somewhat curious provision. If applied improperly, the provision
could conflict with Louisiana’s interdiction laws. This remedy is best
understood as an interim measure that permits the court to appoint a
curator-like person to serve temporarily. The provision should not be
construed as a means to circumventing the normal interdiction procedures.
Indeed, the overall statutory scheme suggests that the court’s authority
under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3854(B)(6) to appoint a curator-like
person ought to be temporary in nature. If the principal requires a more
permanent decisionmaker and lacks capacity to select one himself, then an
interdiction is the appropriate long-term remedy.
4. Defenses and Related Matters
The principal may oppose the action to review. Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:3852 specifically allows the principal to file a motion to
dismiss the action to review. Opposition, however, subjects the principal
to potentially invasive and embarrassing court scrutiny. Before reaching a
decision, the court is required to hold a hearing on the motion “to
determine whether the principal is aware of the acts of the mandatary and
not subject to fraud, duress, or undue influence, is able to comprehend
generally the nature and consequences of the acts of the mandatary, and
appears able to make reasoned decisions.”175
The statute generally requires the principal to testify in person in
support of this motion to allow the court to assess his mental and physical
capacity. as well as to determine the existence of any fraud, duress, or
undue influence.176 Alternatively, the court may allow the principal to
testify via “visual remote technology or by deposition” in appropriate
circumstances.177 Interesting questions may arise in the future regarding
the evidentiary significance of the court’s findings at such a hearing in a
later will contest or similar litigation involving the principal’s
testamentary capacity or undue influence.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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The court is given broad discretion to award attorneys’ fees and costs
in the action to review.178 If, however, an action to review is dismissed on
the merits, then the court is prohibited from awarding costs or attorneys’
fees to the petitioner.179
F. Prescription
The prescriptive period applicable to mandataries has caused some
confusion in the Louisiana courts—in part because of distinctions between
the common law and the civil law traditions. At first blush, actions against
mandataries may seem to sit at the intersection of obligations and delict.
The prescriptive periods for those two actions are quite different: Delictual
actions are subject to a one-year prescriptive period,180 whereas personal
actions, such as those for breach of contract, are usually subject to the
10-year prescriptive period applicable to personal actions.181 In common
law, breach of fiduciary duty is usually a tort and is subject to a tort statute
of limitations.182 Civil law views the issue quite differently. A suit for
breach of any fiduciary obligation stemming from the contract of mandate
is quite clearly a suit on a contract and a personal action subject to the 10year prescriptive period.
Most Louisiana courts are in agreement that “[b]reaches of fiduciary
duty are considered personal actions . . . subject to the ten year
prescription.”183 To preserve the benefit of 10-year prescription, it is
apparently helpful for the plaintiff to specifically allege “self-dealing,
breach of the duty of loyalty, fraud, or breach of trust on the part of his
fiduciary.”184 Louisiana courts have occasionally, and usually incorrectly,
described some breaches of fiduciary duty as delictual.185
In borderline cases, public policy concerns generally support a 10-year
prescriptive period. Louisiana courts have long held that prescription
178. Id. § 9:3855.
179. Id.
180. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 (2018).
181. Id. art. 3499.
182. See supra Part I.
183. De La Vergne v. De La Vergne, 745 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 1999); accord Baxter v. Lewis, 247 So. 3d 873, 876 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2018); Norwood v. Mobley Valve Servs., Inc., 144 So. 3d 1143, 1148 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 2014).
184. Copeland v. Wasserstein, Perella & Co., Inc., 278 F.3d 472, 478 (5th Cir.
2002); accord Babin v. Quality Energy Servs., Inc., 877 F.3d 621, 626 (5th Cir. 2017).
185. E.g., De La Vergne, 745 So. 2d at 1276; Pence v. Austin, 191 So. 3d 608,
614 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2016).
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statutes ought to be construed in a manner that “favors maintaining rather
than barring the action.”186 This generally favors the longer prescriptive
period. Similarly, Louisiana jurisprudence has long held that claims
arising out of quasi-contract prescribe in 10 years.187 Again, this suggests
that borderline cases ought to be afforded the longer prescriptive period.
To distinguish between delict and contract, some courts look at
whether the duty owed by the mandatary is one that arises out of the
fiduciary relationship or whether it is more akin to common negligence.188
Another way of distinguishing delict and contract is to consider the nature
of the harm. For example, “[w]here the unlawful act of one person simply
damages another without resulting benefit to the wrongdoer, there is a
simple tort; and the action for reparation is prescribed by one year.”189 On
the other hand, “[w]here the unlawful act of one person not only damages
another, but also enriches the wrongdoer, there arises an action both ex
delicto and quasi ex contractu and the action to recover the unlawful gain
is barred by the prescription of ten years.”190
1. Prescription: Demand for Accounting
The right to demand an accounting is a personal action subject to a 10year prescriptive period.191 It may be difficult to discern when prescription
commences in an accounting action, and few cases have considered the
accounting obligation in the mandatary context. Cases involving the
accounting obligations of other fiduciaries, such as succession
representatives and trustees, should usually be applicable by analogy. As
is discussed in more detail in Section III.E, Louisiana jurisprudence
indicates the prescriptive period may be tacked to the prescription of
actions against the succession representative in some cases.

186. Foster v. Breaux, 270 So. 2d 526, 529 (La. 1972).
187. See Garland v. Estate of Scott, 15 La. Ann. 143, 145 (1860); Kilpatrick
v. Kilpatrick, 660 So. 2d 182, 186 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
188. Norwood, 144 So. 3d at 1148 (“The distinction between damages ex
contractu and damages ex delicto is that the former flow from the breach of a
special obligation contractually assumed by the obligor, whereas the latter flow
from the violation of a general duty owed to all persons.”).
189. Whitten v. Monkhouse, 29 So. 2d 800, 804 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
190. Id.
191. See Garland, 15 La. Ann. at 145.
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2. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:5647: Five-Year Prescription in
Action to Set Aside Document
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:5647 imposes a five-year prescriptive
period on some actions “to set aside a document or instrument on the ground
that the party executing the document or instrument under authority of a
power of attorney was without the authority to do so, or that the power of
attorney was not valid.” The prescriptive period begins on “the date on
which the document or instrument is recorded in the conveyance records, or
the mortgage records if appropriate.”192 The limitation does not, however,
“limit . . . any action or proceeding which may arise between a principal and
the person acting under authority of a power of attorney.”193
3. Action to Review
The statutes that set forth the action to review do not refer to any
particular prescriptive period. The prescriptive periods otherwise applicable
to actions against mandataries presumably apply to the action to review in
appropriate circumstances. The language of the overall statutory scheme
makes it clear that the mandatary should be currently acting as such when
the action is brought.
III. SUCCESSION REPRESENTATIVES
Many of the rules governing succession representatives are derived from
the rules regulating tutors and curators. Like other fiduciaries, the succession
representative must “act at all times as a prudent administrator.”194 The
fiduciary responsibility of the succession representative is, however,
somewhat different than the responsibility of other fiduciaries because his
fiduciary obligations are owed to both creditors and heirs or legatees.195
Adding to potential complexity, the succession representative may serve dual
roles: It is common for the succession representative to also be a creditor, heir,
or legatee of the decedent. If heirs, legatees, or creditors believe that the
succession representative’s performance is deficient, they have a variety of
remedies.

192. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:5647(A) (2018).
193. Id.
194. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3191(A) (2018).
195. See, e.g., In re Succession of Sylvester, 215 So. 3d 368, 372 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2016) (succession representative’s “fiduciary duty extends to legatees,
creditors, and heirs of the succession.”).
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A. Parties to Litigation Against a Succession Representative
1. Plaintiff
Any party with an interest in the decedent’s estate as an heir, legatee,
trust beneficiary, trustee, or creditor might be a plaintiff in an action
against an executor or administrator, depending on the facts and
circumstances.196 In appropriate cases, suit might be brought by the
successor or legal representative of the injured party.
2. Defendant
The succession representative is the proper defendant in actions
relating to his malfeasance. If he is deceased, suit may be brought against
his succession. Suit may also be brought against his successors if his
succession is not under administration.
B. Venue
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure does not contain a specific
venue rule for actions against succession representatives. In most cases,
venue depends on whether the succession is under administration.
1. Succession Under Administration
If the succession is under administration, then actions against the
succession representative should usually be brought in the succession
proceeding. This approach is endorsed implicitly by the Code of Civil
Procedure.197
2. Closed Succession
When the court has closed the succession and discharged the
succession representative, venue is less clear. As a practical matter, closing
the succession and discharging the succession representative sometimes
precludes subsequent litigation. Usually, the appropriate remedy for
parties who object to the disposition of a succession is to appeal the

196. E.g., Succession of Mitchell, 574 So. 2d 500, 502 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1991) (person who was not an heir, legatee, or creditor of the succession lacked
standing to sue succession representatives).
197. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 3182, 3332, 3334.
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judgment of possession.198 If, however, the aggrieved party was not a party
to the succession proceeding and did not have an opportunity to be heard,
then reopening the succession might be a viable option. The petition to
reopen a succession should be brought in the same venue as the initial
succession proceeding.199
A succession may be reopened “if other property of the succession is
discovered or for any other proper cause.”200 Courts have generally
construed “other proper cause” narrowly, noting that the primary purpose
of the article is to deal with overlooked assets or with a newly discovered
valid will after the succession has been closed.201 Some courts, however,
have given the article a more liberal interpretation, particularly when the
party seeking to reopen the succession was not a party in the original
proceeding. In Succession of Simon, for example, the decedent’s nephew
sought to reopen a succession to claim an interest in the decedent’s
separate property.202 The nephew was allowed to do so, in part, because
the judgment closing the succession was an ex parte proceeding to which
he was not a party.203 A handful of other cases have suggested that fraud
and other egregious conduct might also justify reopening a succession.204
C. Types of Proceedings and Related Issues
The procedural rules in actions against succession representatives can
feel a bit peculiar because successions utilize both ordinary and summary
proceedings.205 Successions may also be opened and succession

198. See Jones v. Jones, 86 So. 3d 25, 29 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012); In re
Successions of Gurtner, 982 So. 2d 952, 956 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2008).
199. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3393.
200. Id. art. 3393(A).
201. See, e.g., In re Succession of Dale, 259 So. 3d 1032, 1034–35 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2018) (“Courts have found ‘other proper cause’ under La. Code Civ.
P. art. 3393. to exist under extremely limited circumstances, such as where a valid
will is discovered after the administration of a succession.”); accord Succession
of Lasseigne, 488 So. 2d 1303, 1306 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
202. Blanc v. Succession of Simon, 295 So. 2d 569, 572 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1974).
203. Id.
204. Succession of Chatelain, 788 So. 2d 620, 622–26 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2001) (Plotkin, J., dissenting); Succession of McCarthy, 583 So. 2d 140, 142 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
205. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2971 cmts. a, b (2003); see also LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2931 (2018) (action to annul a testament tried as summary
proceeding).
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representatives appointed on an ex parte basis.206 This approach can add
some additional confusion if some aspect of the succession or the
appointment of the succession representative is later contested. The rules
relating to service and citation in contested successions are also slightly
different from comparable rules in other settings.207
Most actions considered in this Article are against acting succession
representatives. In such cases, the succession is already open, and the
action is brought within the existing succession proceeding. An action to
remove a succession representative, for instance, should be brought in the
succession proceeding and tried as a summary proceeding.208 Similarly,
the demand for an accounting from the succession representative can also
be brought summarily in the succession proceeding.209 An opposition to
an accounting is likewise tried as a summary proceeding.210 At least one
case—Succession of Twine—has held that a court may order an accounting
without a prior evidentiary hearing.211
The Code of Civil Procedure is less clear on whether actions for
damages against succession representatives should be brought as summary
proceedings or as ordinary proceedings. The reported decisions seem to
imply that the answer depends on whether they are brought in connection
with some other action, such as an action seeking removal of a succession
representative or opposition of an accounting. Where damages are
awarded in connection with an action that can otherwise be brought as a
summary proceeding, it appears that the damages can be awarded as a part
of that same proceeding.212
D. Remedies Available
A variety of remedies are available in actions against a succession
representative. Some remedies seek to prevent additional harm or to
facilitate a better administration of the estate. Others seek to redress actual
financial harm caused by the succession representative’s malfeasance. In
206. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 2881–93, 3001, 3031, 3061 (2018).
207. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2971 cmt. a (2003).
208. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3182 (2018).
209. See id. art. 3331.
210. Id. art. 3336.
211. In re Succession of Twine, 54 So. 3d 71, 73 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2010).
212. See, e.g., Succession of Vazquez, 976 So. 2d 209, 212 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 2008) (succession representative ordered to pay reimbursement in a hearing
on a motion); Succession of Raziano, 538 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (La. Ct. App. 5th
Cir. 1989) (succession representative ordered to pay reimbursement in a hearing
on a rule to show cause).
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many instances, the remedies are similar to remedies available in the direct
action against a mandatary.
1. Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief may be sought against a succession representative. As
discussed in Section II.D.2, above, injunctive relief usually requires a
showing of irreparable harm and lack of adequate remedy at law. Damages
in the succession setting are sometimes susceptible of pecuniary valuation,
thus precluding a finding of irreparable harm.213 Louisiana jurisprudence,
however, recognizes a variety of instances in which injunctive relief is
allowed that might be applicable in actions against succession
representatives or other fiduciaries.
Injunctive relief is usually allowed “when the conduct sought to be
enjoined constitutes a direct violation of a prohibitory law and/or a
violation of a constitutional right.”214 Some courts allow injunctive relief
when the case involves a property owner seeking to protect his rights in
immovable property.215 Injunctive relief is available in the face of potential
violations of certain contractual obligations.216 The possibility of harm to
goodwill, reputation, or competitive edge may also support injunctive
relief.217
Few cases have considered injunctive relief in depth in the successions
context. Two, however, offer some insight. In Nunez v. Erbelding, the
decedent’s forced heirs unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the executor from
selling cattle that had belonged to the decedent.218 The forced heirs
complained that if the sale proceeded as planned, then they would not have
adequate opportunity to count and appraise the cattle.219 The court,
however, noted that the forced heirs “failed to show the necessary
irreparable harm to entitle them to the issuance of an injunction” because
213. See In re Succession of Scurria, 47 So. 3d 620, 630 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
2010).
214. Constr. Diva, LLC, v. New Orleans Aviation Bd., 206 So. 3d 1029, 1035
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2016); accord Jurisich v. Jenkins, 749 So. 2d 597, 599 (La.
1999).
215. See Cason v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 92 So. 3d 436, 445 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 2012).
216. See Reliable Amusement Co., Inc. v. Poche, 853 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (La.
Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2003).
217. E.g., Historic Restoration, Inc. v. RSUI Indem. Co., 955 So. 2d 200, 209
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2007).
218. Nunez v. Erbelding, 442 So. 2d 1335, 1336 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
219. Id.
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“any loss suffered as a result [of selling the cattle] is injury which could be
readily compensated in money and easily measured by pecuniary
standards.”220 The court also suggested that injunctive relief was not needed
because the Code of Civil Procedure articles relating to probate procedure
afforded many additional protections and remedies to the forced heirs.221
The court’s suggestion is notable because some of those protections would
not be available if the succession representative was acting as an
independent succession representative. Perhaps injunctive relief would be
appropriate against an independent succession representative.
The use of human gametes, in contrast, does support injunctive relief.
Hall v. Fertility Institute of New Orleans involved competing claims to a
decedent’s frozen sperm.222 The executor claimed that the frozen sperm
belonged to the succession. The decedent’s girlfriend, on the other hand,
claimed that the decedent had donated the frozen sperm to her.223 The court
found that injunctive relief was appropriate pending trial on the merits
because of the nature of the potential harm:
We have examined the consequences should preliminary
injunctive relief be denied, and find the potential consequences to
constitute irreparable harm. Should St. John be allowed to obtain
Hall’s sperm deposits during the pendency of this action, one or
more embryos could well come into existence. Depending on the
length of time the matter requires prior to final conclusion, the
possible development of human beings is such a serious
consequence that the irreparable nature of the risk at issue is clear.
The emotional damage to the decedent’s mother and Executrix
should the donation prove to have been illegally obtained and
children sired against the wishes of her dead son is obvious and
cannot be compensated adequately. Further, the determination of
the validity of the act of donation should be made without the
influence of the existence of embryos or an actual pregnancy.224
Taken together, Nunez v. Erbelding and Hall v. Fertility Institute of New
Orleans represent opposite ends of the spectrum. Courts will have to look
to other jurisprudence for guidance on more nuanced factual scenarios.

220. Id. at 1337–38.
221. Id. at 1338.
222. Hall v. Fertility Inst. of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 1994).
223. Id. at 1349–50.
224. Id. at 1351.

344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd 45

8/17/20 7:18 AM

702

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

2. Demanding an Accounting
The succession representative’s obligations of good faith and prudent
administration require him to identify interested parties and to keep them
apprised of the administration of the succession.225 A useful method of
compelling performance of this obligation is to demand an accounting
from the succession representative. A demand for an accounting serves
many of the same strategic functions in actions against succession
representatives as it does in actions against mandataries. Sometimes, the
succession representative was also the decedent’s mandatary prior to
death, in which case the demand for accounting should cover both
positions.226 If relevant, the succession representative should also be
required to account for actions he took before being confirmed as
succession representative.227
The succession representative’s accounting obligation is somewhat
better defined than that of the mandatary. The succession representative is
required to file accounts with the court annually “and at any other time
when ordered by the court on its own motion or on the application of any
interested person.”228 The succession representative is also obligated to file
a final account.229 The accounting obligation of an independent succession
representative is somewhat different because annual accounts are not
generally required; however, “any person interested in the estate may
demand an annual accounting” in the same manner as demanding an
accounting from a regular succession representative.230 Upon the
“application of any interested person,” the court may also “require an
independent [succession representative] to furnish accountings at more
frequent intervals.”231 If the succession representative dies or is
interdicted, “an account of his administration may be filed by his heirs or
by his legal representative; and upon the petition of an interested party, the

225. See In re Succession of Ferguson, 114 So. 3d 1260, 1264 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 2013); Langendorf v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 361 So. 2d 905, 908–
10 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Succession of Hearn, 412 So. 2d 692, 700 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
226. See Succession of Granger v. Worthington, 829 So. 2d 1108, 1110–11
(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2002); Succession of Moore, 737 So. 2d 749, 756 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 1998).
227. See Granger, 829 So. 2d at 1110–11; Moore, 737 So. 2d at 756.
228. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3331 (2018).
229. Id. art. 3332.
230. Id. art. 3396.17.
231. Id.
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court shall order the filing of such an account.”232 The term “interested
person” generally refers to any person with an interest in the decedent’s
property, such as an heir, legatee, creditor, trustee, or beneficiary of a
trust.233 Given that a court could also raise the issue on its own motion,
courts ought to give the term a broad and liberal construction.
Once the succession representative has rendered an accounting, an
“opposition . . . may be filed at any time before homologation,” and it
“shall be tried as a summary proceeding.”234 The burden of proving “the
correctness of every item in the account” is on the succession
representative.235 Once a court has issued a judgment homologating an
account, the burden changes: “A judgment homologating any account
other than a final account shall be prima facie evidence of the correctness
of the account.”236 Moreover, “[a] judgment homologating a final account
has the same effect as a final judgment in an ordinary action.”237 A final
account may cover issues already addressed in an annual account. If the
court has already homologated the annual account, then issues covered by
that account are considered prima facie correct, and the burden is on the
party challenging them in the final account.238
3. Removal of Succession Representative
A succession representative may be removed upon the motion of any
interested party or by the court on its own motion.239 The procedure and
grounds for removal are essentially the same for independent succession
representatives and those subject to ordinary administration.240 Removal
requires a contradictory hearing and can be a summary proceeding.241
The party seeking removal has the burden of proof, and “the trial court
is vested with discretion in determining whether removal of a succession

232. Id. art. 3338.
233. Succession of Benoit, 199 So. 625, 631–32 (La. 1940) (heirs); In re
Succession of Lowe, No. 2017-CW-0554, 2017 WL 3404959 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. Aug. 9, 2017) (trust beneficiaries).
234. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3336.
235. Succession of Goffinet, 565 So. 2d 951, 952 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
236. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3337.
237. Id.
238. See In re Succession of Ballex, No. 2015-CA-1647, 2016 WL 1535070,
at *3 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. Apr. 15, 2016).
239. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3182.
240. See id. art. 3396.20.
241. Id. arts. 3182, 3396.20.
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representative is appropriate under the particular facts.”242 The moving
party must “prove by convincing evidence that the representative either
breached his fiduciary duty to the succession under Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 3191 or the existence of one of the grounds for
removal enumerated in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
3182.”243 Generally, courts have not specified whether “convincing
evidence” is more similar to a preponderance of the evidence or clear and
convincing evidence.
If the plaintiff’s grounds for removal are proven, the court is not
necessarily required to remove the succession representative. Rather, the
trial court “is vested with discretion to determine whether removal is
appropriate under the facts of the particular case.”244 On appeal, the trial
court’s decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.245
The Code of Civil Procedure sets forth a number of grounds for
removal. Article 3182 allows removal of “any succession representative
who is or has become disqualified” or who “has become incapable of
discharging the duties of his office.”246 Removal is likewise permitted if
the succession representative “has mismanaged the estate” or “has failed
to perform any duty imposed by law or by order of court.”247 Finally,
removal may be appropriate if the succession representative “has ceased
to be a domiciliary of the state without appointing an agent as provided in
article 3097(4), or has failed to give notice of his application for
appointment when required under article 3093.”248
Usually, courts liberally construe the timing issues suggested by
article 3182’s use of present perfect verb tenses. In some cases, the reasons
a succession representative ought to be removed existed when he was
appointed, and had a party raised them, the party could have prevented the
initial appointment.249 The courts’ liberal reading of the statute
appropriately affords some additional discretion in these situations. Courts
routinely appoint succession representatives without a hearing and without
242. In re Succession of Dean, 247 So. 3d 746, 763 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018).
243. Id. at 762; accord Succession of Brazan, 975 So. 2d 53, 56 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2007).
244. Brazan, 975 So. 2d at 56.
245. Id. at 56–57; Dean, 247 So. 3d at 763.
246. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3182.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. E.g., Succession of Luwisch, 675 So. 2d 799, 801–02 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 1996) (executor removed due to his poor management skills and lack of
education, which were circumstances that existed at the time of his initial
appointment).
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giving all interested parties an opportunity to be heard, all of which is
permitted by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Code of Civil Procedure
does not, however, provide a clear method for interested parties to later
challenge the initial appointment of a succession representative. A liberal
construction of article 3182 provides a practical approach by allowing
removal on the basis of issues that existed at the time of the initial
appointment.
All but two grounds for removal are discussed in more detail in the
sections below. Omitted are a nondomiciliary’s failure to appoint an agent
and the failure to give notice of application for appointment as succession
representative. Those two grounds are reasonably straightforward and
rarely give rise to significant controversy.
a. Succession Representative Has Become Disqualified
A succession representative may be removed if he becomes
disqualified.250 Grounds for disqualification are largely based on tutorship
and interdiction, which may provide some useful analogies.
Disqualifications include: (1) interdiction or proven mentally incompetent
after a contradictory hearing; (2) conviction of a felony; and (3) proven
unfit for appointment because of bad moral character after a contradictory
hearing.251 A handful of other disqualifications exist—for example,
minority—but they are more likely to disqualify a person from initial
appointment rather than subsequent removal.252 Felony conviction and
interdiction should be straightforward matters to prove in a removal action
by introducing court records or similar evidence. Interestingly, courts have
occasionally shown a somewhat lenient attitude toward certain felony
convictions as a basis for removal.253
Mental incompetence, in the absence of an interdiction proceeding,
and bad moral character are more nuanced issues. Unfortunately, few
Louisiana cases have considered these grounds for removal.254 In the
tutorship context, Planiol described incapacity as “inefficiency and want
of judgment in the conduct of business due to want of intelligence or

250. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3182.
251. Id. art. 3097.
252. Id.
253. See Succession of Bernstine, 879 So. 2d 411, 413 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2004); Succession of Thomas, 596 So. 2d 348, 352 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
Compelling arguments could be made in support of a lenient attitude depending
on the felony in question.
254. Thomas, 596 So. 2d at 352.
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will.”255 Given the proximity of the term “mentally incompetent” to the
term “interdiction” in Code of Civil Procedure article 3097, disqualifying
mental incompetence likely also includes persons with intellectual or
cognitive deficiencies that would affect the ability to discharge the duties
of the office. For example, a person with diminished mental acuity due to
Alzheimer’s disease or a traumatic brain injury might be disqualified for
mental incompetence. In some instances, removal for mental
incompetence will overlap with removal for being incapable under
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3182, discussed in more detail
below.
Bad moral character seems like a curious legal standard in the modern
era. Prior Civil Code articles likened bad morals to “notorious
misbehavior”256 and “[p]ersons of a conduct notoriously bad.”257 The
majority of the Louisiana cases considering the standard do so in the
tutorship context and are generally unhelpful in the modern era.258
Succession of Horrell is one of the only cases to consider the alleged bad
morals of a succession representative.259 This case suggests that bad moral
character includes “the traditional types of behavior or previous bad acts
which would indicate that one is not fit to assume the responsibilities of
administrator of a succession.”260 The decision provides no citation for that
proposition, but it does seem like a reasonable interpretation of the phrase
in the successions context.
Succession of Horrell went further and explained that bad moral
character was not strictly limited to “traditional types of behavior or
previous bad acts.”261 The court found that the decedent’s son, an attorney
in good standing, should be disqualified as succession representative
because of the “extraordinary amount of animosity between the family
members” and the son’s involvement in getting his mentally incompetent
father to execute a will.262 Although not mentioned by the court, the
holding aligns nicely with Civil Code article 1481, which prohibits a
255. PLANIOL, supra note 41, § 1845.
256. Id.
257. LA. CIV. CODE art. 303, repealed by Act 1960, No. 30, § 2, effective Jan.
1, 1961.
258. See, e.g., Succession of Le Blanc, 37 La. Ann. 546, 548–49 (La. 1885)
(equating notorious bad conduct to nonmarital sex); Succession of Tate, 123 So.
590, 591 (La. 1929) (mother was unfit tutor of her children because she had
interracial romantic relationships).
259. Succession of Horrell, 709 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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person who “commits fraud or exercises duress or unduly influences a
donor” from serving in a fiduciary capacity. From a practical standpoint,
proving fraud, duress, or undue influence under Civil Code article 1481 is
a difficult and sometimes time-consuming process. The Succession of
Horrell approach allows a court to go ahead and remove a succession
representative before an actual trial on the merits of the fraud, duress, or
undue influence claims. If the court has some credible evidence of fraud,
duress, or undue influence on the part of a succession representative, then
the court is reasonable in deciding that the succession representative
should be removed because of bad moral character. A similar approach
and rationale might also be applicable in cases involving unworthiness and
ingratitude.263
Succession of Thomas264 is a less sound decision. The succession
representative was accused of bad moral character because of a recent
arrest for criminal mischief, two prior criminal convictions for simple
battery, and her “fail[ure] to report pertinent information to welfare
authorities.”265 The court, however, did not believe that these facts were
sufficiently severe to disqualify her from serving as succession
representative.266 The case seems wrongly decided in light of the
succession representative’s criminal convictions. On the other hand, our
evolving views about incarceration relating to minor drug offenses, the
racial dynamics of the criminal justice system, and the movement to
restore rights to felons who have served their time might warrant a more
lenient approach.
Succession of Bernstine also involved an unsuccessful attempt to
disqualify a succession representative due to bad moral character.267 The
plaintiffs alleged that the succession representative stole Christmas
presents from his mother’s house to buy money for drugs, used marijuana,
and had various drug related arrests and convictions.268 Little evidence was
offered in support of the allegations.269 Even if proven, courts ought to
resist characterizing a person suffering from an addiction as having bad
moral character. The courts could just as easily remove such a person on
the less stigmatizing basis of being incapable to discharge the duties of
office.
263. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 940–46 (2018) (unworthiness); id. arts. 1556–60
(ingratitude).
264. Succession of Thomas, 596 So. 2d. 348 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
265. Id. at 352.
266. Id.
267. Succession of Bernstine, 879 So. 2d 411, 413 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004).
268. Id.
269. Id.

344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd 51

8/17/20 7:18 AM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

708

[Vol. 80

b. Succession Representative Has Become Incapable of Discharging
the Duties of His Office
The court may remove a succession representative upon a showing
that he “has become incapable of discharging the duties of his office.”270
The handful of cases that have considered this basis for removal suggest
that it has potential utility due to its broad scope. In Succession of Luwisch,
the decedent’s husband was removed as executor because he lacked the
requisite skills, training, and education.271 The court emphasized that “lack
of education and training alone do not form the basis for . . . removal.”272
The lack of education and training does, however, “help[] to determine
whether he has the skills to properly manage the estate.”273 Taken together,
those facts supported a finding that the succession representative was
incapable of discharging the duties of his office. The decision does not
describe the facts in the case in depth other than referencing the husband’s
decision to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding and statements he made at
trial, such as: “I can’t remember if I’m living half of the time.”274
Nonetheless, the case illustrates that this basis may allow removal of a
succession representative suffering from a mental decline without the
necessity of adjudicating him mentally incompetent. It could also allow
removal on the grounds of poor financial skills.
In Succession of Moses, the executor was under indictment for first
degree murder of the decedent, her husband.275 The court removed her as
executor because she could not properly administer the estate while she
was incarcerated and awaiting trial.276 As the court explained: “The test is,
considering all of the circumstances, whether such incarceration has in fact
adversely affected the representative’s ability to serve to the detriment of
the succession. The record shows that the property of the succession has
not been well-maintained during Mrs. Moses’ administration.”277 Despite
the court’s apparently generous view of murder indictments, it seems
obvious that a murder indictment—particularly one relating to the
decedent—ought to be evidence of either bad moral character or a conflict
of interest sufficient to warrant removal. In any event, the rationale of
Succession of Moses could extend to other cases in which some practical
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
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obstacle, like being out of the state or country for an extended period of
time, prevents the succession representative from devoting sufficient time
and attention to the administration.
Courts have recognized that a conflict of interest may cause a
succession representative to become incapable of discharging the duties of
his office. Some conflicts of interest may be unavoidable, particularly
where the succession representative is also an heir, legatee, or creditor.
These structural conflicts of interest do not necessarily require removal.278
If, however, “this conflict becomes such that it is actively tainting the
administration of the succession, removal of the executor becomes
necessary.”279
Succession of Robinson demonstrates a conflict of interest sufficient
for removal.280 The decedent’s husband was initially appointed as
succession representative, despite the fact that he and the decedent were
in the middle of a contested divorce at the time of her death.281 The
husband owed alimony arrearages to the decedent that her succession
representative would be expected to pursue and collect.282 The decedent’s
mother successfully sought removal of the husband as succession
representative due to his conflict of interest with respect to the alimony
arrearages.283 The court noted that a conflict of interest is not always
grounds for removal of a succession representative.284 Given the facts of
the case, however, the husband “cannot reasonably be expected to enforce
diligently all obligations in the succession’s favor”; therefore, “his
removal was justified . . . in that he is incapable of discharging the
fiduciary duties of his office.”285
Removal on the basis of being incapable might also be useful when
there is evidence that the succession representative has a bad moral
character or is mentally incompetent. Concerned heirs and legatees may
be hesitant to assert that the succession representative has a bad moral
character or is mentally incompetent, particularly where the succession
representative is a relative who would find such allegations offensive. The
court might also be hesitant to make that stigmatizing finding on the
record. The broader category of being deemed “incapable” may be a more
278. Succession of Montgomery, 452 So. 2d 297, 299 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1984); Succession of Mangle, 452 So. 2d 197, 200 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
279. Succession of Demarest, 418 So. 2d 1368, 1374 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
280. Succession of Robinson, 393 So. 2d 268, 269 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 270.
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palatable basis for removal in these circumstances. Individuals with poor
financial management skills, poor physical or psychological health, or
ongoing substance abuse issues might be removed under this catch-all
category. Finally, removal for incapability might be appropriate when
hostility between the succession representative and the heirs or legatees
renders the succession representative unwilling or unable to communicate
with the heirs or legatees.
c. Succession Representative Has Mismanaged the Estate
Mismanagement of the property under the succession representative’s
care is grounds for removal.286 A number of reported decisions involve the
attempted—and sometimes successful—removal of a succession
representative for mismanagement. Mismanagement usually involves
some breach of fiduciary obligation by the succession representative. The
Louisiana Supreme Court, relying heavily on common law authority, has
described mismanagement as follows:
Also clear is the definition of the word “mismanage”, which
simply means to manage badly, improperly or unskillfully. It
connotes the commission of an act or the omission of a duty which
redounds to the detriment of the estate; an act or omission usually
amounting to misconduct or breach of trust to warrant removal.287
Evidence that the succession representative failed to administer the
succession in the manner contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure is
usually evidence of mismanagement. Mismanagement often overlaps with
“failure to perform any duty imposed by law,”288 a basis for removal
discussed in more detail in the following section.
Courts have found mismanagement warranting removal in a variety of
circumstances. In Succession of Mangle, the succession representative’s
failure to “contact the forced heirs concerning their entitlement to the
forced portion or notify them of their grandmother’s estate” constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty justifying removal.289 In Succession of LaFleur,
the succession representative was removed for ignoring the instructions of
the will in order to benefit his own interest in a family company and for
286. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3182 (2018).
287. Succession of Houssiere, 174 So. 2d 521, 524–25 (La. 1965) (internal
citations omitted); accord Succession of Horrell, 79 So. 3d 1162, 1166 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 2011).
288. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3182.
289. Succession of Mangle, 452 So. 2d 197, 201 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
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engaging in other transactions that inured to his benefit and to the
detriment of the succession.290 In Succession of Dunham, the succession
representative was removed for mismanagement relating to conflicts of
interest between her position as succession representative and as a director
and officer of a related corporation.291 The succession representative
clearly breached her fiduciary obligations in allowing succession property
to be sold to the corporation for far less than market value.292
Some courts are more forgiving of imprudent acts. In Succession of
Dean, the independent executor improperly joined an action—in her
capacity as executor—to challenge the decedent’s will.293 The court held
that this action did not justify her removal, particularly in light of her
otherwise competent administration of the estate and the “unsettled nature
of the previous jurisprudence addressing the rights and duties of a
succession representative to challenge the validity of the decedent’s
will.”294 In a more dubious opinion, Succession of McIntire, the court
allowed the executor to remain in office despite ample evidence showing
that he failed to open a succession bank account, continued withdrawing
and spending funds belonging to the decedent, failed to obtain needed
appraisals, failed to file any accountings, failed to account for all of the
succession’s assets, and paid debts without the required court approval.295
d. Succession Representative Has Failed to Perform Any Duty
Imposed by Law or by Order of Court
The succession representative may be removed if he “has failed to
perform any duty imposed by law or by order of court.”296 This includes a
whole host of duties set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure. For example,
the succession representative is under a duty to open a succession bank
account and deposit funds therein;297 to “preserve, repair, maintain, and
protect the property of the succession”;298 and to prepare and file various
accountings, inventories, and descriptive lists.299

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
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Succession of Dean, 247 So. 3d 746, 763–64 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018).
Id.
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Some generalizations can be made from the ample jurisprudence that
considers this basis for removal. First, isolated failures to comply with
statutorily prescribed duties usually will not constitute sufficient grounds
for removal. For example, in Succession of Linder, the succession
representative’s failure to update the final tableau to reflect the receipt of
royalty checks did not justify removal, particularly considering his overall
prudent administration of the succession.300 On the other hand, repeated
failures or particularly egregious failures do justify removal. In Succession
of LeBouef, removal was warranted where co-administrators repeatedly
failed to obtain the required prior court approval before selling succession
property, paid themselves without prior court approval, and failed to
deposit the decedent’s funds into a succession bank account.301 In
Succession of Cucchero, removal was appropriate where the succession
representative filed no accountings between 1996 and 2001.302 Finally, a
succession representative who fails to comply with a court order usually
will—unsurprisingly—end up removed. The mere failure to file an annual
account, for example, is not usually grounds for removal.303 Failing to
render annual or final accounts in accordance with a court order or
rendering deficient accounts in response to a court order to render
accountings, however, will likely result in removal.304
4. Conversion of Independent Administration to Ordinary
Administration
One additional remedy exists in the case of independent succession
representatives: conversion to an ordinary proceeding. Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 3396.20 allows conversion “on the motion of any
interested person” and following a “contradictory hearing” and a finding
of “good cause.” Louisiana courts have not yet had much opportunity to
consider the meaning of “good cause.” Presumably, good cause exists
when there is reasonable doubt regarding the succession representative’s
prudent administration of the estate. Conversion to an ordinary
administration may also be an appropriate interim measure while the court
determines whether grounds exist for removal of the succession
representative.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
1993).
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5. Money Damages
The succession representative “shall be personally responsible for all
damages resulting from his failure” to act as a prudent administrator.305
Louisiana courts clearly accept restoration damages as a measure of
damages for a succession representative’s malfeasance.306 It is less clear
whether courts will hold succession representatives liable for disgorgementtype damages or lost profit damages. These damages are available in a direct
action against a mandatary307 and ought to be available in analogous cases
involving succession representatives.
The succession representative may be held liable for failing to
properly insure succession property. In Succession of Vazquez, the
succession representative was held liable for succession property damaged
during Hurricane Katrina because the succession representative failed to
insure the property.308 It did not matter that the decedent had let the
insurance lapse prior to his death: The succession representative, as a
prudent administrator, was bound to insure the property.309 The succession
representative may also be held liable for the “loss occasioned by
negligence or misconduct of his agent or attorney.”310 In Succession of
Hess, the succession representative was held liable for succession funds
that were misappropriated by his attorney.311
A succession representative can be held liable for failing to accurately
value succession property. As a prudent administrator, the succession
representative “is required to obtain knowledge of the value of the assets
of the succession for various purposes.”312 In particular, “[a] succession
representative has a legal obligation to secure the best price reasonably
available as consideration for the conveyance of succession property.”313
In Scurria v. Hodge, the succession representatives sold succession
property for less than fair market value and were held liable for the
discrepancy between the price of the sale and the actual fair market value
of the property.314 Similarly, in Succession of Irving, the succession

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
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representative was held “liable for the difference in the market values at
the time of the respective sales and the actual sales prices.”315
6. Voiding Self-Dealing Transactions
Succession representatives are generally prohibited from engaging in
self-dealing.316 Self-dealing may, of course, be grounds for removal.
Additional remedies are also available in some instances. If the succession
representative engages in a prohibited self-dealing contract, the contract is
“voidable,” and the succession representative is “liable to the succession
for all damages resulting therefrom.”317 Unfortunately, Louisiana courts
have not considered this provision in much depth in recent years.
7. Forfeiture of Compensation
A succession representative is ordinarily entitled to reasonable
compensation for his services.318 If a succession representative has
breached his fiduciary duties, the other parties may balk at compensating
him. In some cases, an interested party may successfully petition the court
to reduce or deny compensation to the succession representative. The Code
of Civil Procedure does not directly contemplate a denial or reduction of
compensation in cases of succession representative malfeasance. The
Louisiana Supreme Court, however, has held that compensation can be
denied in appropriate cases,319 a position that lower courts have
reaffirmed.320
8. Penalties Relating to Succession Bank Accounts
The succession representative is required to utilize what is often called
a “succession bank account.” Specifically, he is required to “deposit all
moneys collected by him as soon as received in a bank account in his
official capacity, in a state or national bank in this state, and shall not
withdraw the deposits or any part thereof, except in accordance with
law.”321 Failure to comply with this obligation can result in significant
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
2008).
321.
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penalties: “[T]he court may render a judgment against the succession
representative and his surety in solido to the extent of twenty percent
interest per annum on the amount not deposited or withdrawn without
authority, such sum to be paid to the succession.”322 The court may also
hold him “liable for all special damage suffered.”323 In applying this
penalty, Louisiana courts have held that the penalty should not be imposed
unless there is also a finding of bad faith or intentional wrongdoing on the
part of the succession representative.324
E. Prescription
The general rules of prescription for actions relating to breach of
fiduciary obligations by a succession representative are comparable to the
rules in the mandatary setting. Generally, causes of action arising out of
the succession representative’s breach of fiduciary obligations are
personal actions subject to the 10-year prescriptive period.325 Of course,
the courts have not always been consistent on this point, and there is some
confusion in the jurisprudence.326
Interestingly, courts have essentially extended the scope of a
succession representative’s obligations—and the 10-year prescriptive
period—to acts that took place before the succession representative was
confirmed as such on the theory that the succession representative had a
duty to recover the funds once confirmed.327 This “tacking” of prescription
can be particularly helpful in cases where the malfeasance of a mandatary
is not discovered until after the death of the principal. Prescription tacking
is also helpful where the succession representative engaged in some
wrongful act prior to having any authority as a fiduciary.
In Succession of Granger v. Worthington, the decedent’s cousin,
Worthington, withdrew funds from various bank accounts following the
decedent’s death but prior to Worthington’s appointment as succession
representative.328 The bank accounts were jointly titled in the names of the
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. E.g., Succession of Cook, 244 So. 3d 686, 690 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
2017); Succession of Hess, 205 So. 2d 74, 77 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
325. Fuller v. Baggette, 847 So. 2d 26, 34 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003);
Succession of Granger v. Worthington, 829 So. 2d 1108, 1110 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2002).
326. E.g., Manion v. Pollingue, 524 So. 2d 25, 32 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
327. See Granger, 829 So. 2d at 1110–11; Succession of Moore, 737 So. 2d
749, 756 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
328. Granger, 829 So. 2d at 1110–11.

344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd 59

8/17/20 7:18 AM

716

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

decedent and Worthington, but the funds belonged to the succession.329
Once Worthington’s misappropriation of the funds came to light, she
agreed to resign as succession representative, and her successor
representative sought the funds’ return to the estate.330 Worthington argued
that any claim against her had prescribed and pointed out that she was not
acting as succession representative when she took the funds.331 The court
disagreed. Once Worthington was appointed as succession representative,
she had a fiduciary obligation to pursue any misappropriated funds,
including the ones she had misappropriated, prior to her appointment.332
Her failure to do so constituted a breach of her fiduciary duty as succession
representative and was subject to the 10-year prescriptive period.333
1. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:5621: Two-Year Prescription for
Certain Actions Against Succession Representative
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:5621 provides that actions “arising out
of any act of the succession representative, as such, may have done or
failed to do, are prescribed by two years reckoning from the day of the
judgment homologating the final account.”334 The statute goes on to
explain that this two-year prescriptive period “does not apply to actions
for the recovery of any funds or other property misappropriated by the
succession representative nor to actions for any amount not paid in
accordance with the proposed payments shown on the final account.”335
Rather, such actions are subject to the 10-year prescriptive period.336
Jurisprudence interpreting the statute has generally given it a narrow
scope, particularly where the narrow scope benefits the injured party by
allowing a longer prescriptive period. Louisiana courts are in general
agreement that the statute does not apply to claims for breach of fiduciary
obligation.337 Those claims remain subject to a 10-year prescriptive

329. Id. at 1109.
330. Id. at 1109–10.
331. Id. at 1110.
332. Id. at 1110–11.
333. Id.
334. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:5621 (2018).
335. Id.
336. Succession of Moore, 737 So. 2d 749, 756 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
337. Winder v. George, No. 2007 CA 0314, 2007 WL 4532139, at *9 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2007); Fuller v. Baggette, 847 So. 2d 26, 34 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
2003); Granger, 829 So. 2d at 1110.
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period.338 The cases have done little, however, to explain exactly which
actions are subject to the two-year prescriptive period.
Succession of Raziano339 is an anomaly and likely a result-driven
decision that is best explained by the court’s desire to allow a suit to
proceed. The succession representative claimed that he was robbed when
he had succession cash in hand.340 His story was not very credible, and it
seemed more likely that he simply kept the money for himself.341 The
decedent’s heirs brought suit seeking a return of the funds, as well as a
20% penalty for failure to deposit the funds in a succession bank
account—a suit that seems to fall squarely within the definition of
misappropriation or breach of fiduciary duty, or both.342 More than 10
years had elapsed since the disappearance of the funds, meaning that any
personal action had prescribed.343 The court, however, had not yet
homologated the final account, meaning that the two-year prescriptive
period had not yet elapsed.344 The court held that the action was subject to
the two-year period on the theory that the heirs’ suit “was not one for
misappropriation of funds.”345 Rather, the court said that “it was a claim
based on malfeasance . . . for failure to perform his fiduciary duty, i.e.,
deposit and maintain the succession funds in a state or national bank in an
official succession account and not to withdraw same except in accordance
with law.”346
2. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:5632: Two-Year Prescription for
Defects in Alienation, Encumbrance, or Leases
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:5632 sets forth another special twoyear prescriptive period that allows a party to set aside certain transactions
when the succession representative lacked the requisite authority:
When the legal procedure is defective or does not comply with the
requisites of law in the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of
movable or immovable property made by a legal representative of
a succession, minor, or interdict, provided an order of court has
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
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been entered authorizing such alienation, encumbrance, or lease,
any action shall be prescribed against by those claiming such
defect or lack of compliance after the lapse of two years from the
time of making such alienation, encumbrance, or lease.347
The rule also applies to independent succession representatives “provided an
order of court has been entered authorizing independent alienation . . . .”348
This rule is intended for the protection of third parties. It should not preclude
a suit for damages for breach of a fiduciary duty by a succession
representative, so long as the suit is brought within 10 years. Rather, the statute
limits the time frame for voiding the unauthorized transaction.
IV. TRUSTEES
The fiduciary obligations of Louisiana trustees are quite similar to the
fiduciary obligations of mandataries, succession representatives, and
curators or tutors. If the beneficiary believes that the trustee has breached
his fiduciary obligations, the Louisiana Trust Code sets out a variety of
remedies.
A. Parties to Trustee Litigation
1. Parties to Litigation Against a Trustee
The beneficiary of a trust or his legal representative is the proper party
to bring suit against the trustee.349 A settlor who has retained an interest in
an inter vivos trust as a beneficiary has the same rights. A settlor who has
retained rights in a trust—though perhaps not as a beneficiary—might also
have standing to bring suit against the trustee in some circumstances.350
The trustee is the proper defendant in an action brought against him
relating to his administration of the trust.
2. Suits by Beneficiaries Against Third Parties
The trustee is “the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of the trust
estate.”351 If, however, the trustee is unable or unwilling to bring suit, a

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
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beneficiary may bring suit directly to protect his rights. Section 2222 of
the Trust Code provides that the beneficiary:
[M]ay sue to enforce [a right of the trust estate], in order to protect
his own interest, in an action against: (1) A trustee and an obligor,
if the trustee improperly refuses, neglects, or is unable for any
reason, to bring an action against the obligor; or (2) An obligor, if
there is no trustee or the trustee cannot be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the proper court.352
The purpose of § 2222 is a practical one, and a similar approach is taken
in other jurisdictions.353 If the trustee cannot—or will not—act, then the
cause of action might prescribe before the beneficiary can successfully sue
to compel the trustee to act or bring other remedial action.354 Likewise, the
obligor may become insolvent during the time delay in which the
beneficiary seeks remedial action against the trustee.355 Section 2222 also
affords relief to the beneficiary when the trustee is responsible for
malfeasance when serving in a different fiduciary or personal capacity.
Some jurisdictions will apparently allow the beneficiary and the trustee to
join together to bring suit against third parties.356 Thus far, Louisiana
courts have not permitted this approach.357
B. Venue
Trust litigation must usually be brought in the “proper court.” This
term is defined by reference to a detailed set of rules in § 2235 of the Trust
Code. These jurisdictional rules are fairly clear and have not given rise to
much litigation.
Section 2235 generally recognizes the enforceability of forum
selection clauses in trust instruments. Forum selection clauses in inter
vivos trusts are immediately effective.358 Forum selection clauses in mortis
causa trusts, however, are only effective “after the trustee is put into
possession of the entire legacy.”359 Prior to that time, venue is proper in
the court that has jurisdiction over the succession. The Trust Code also
352. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2222.
353. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 869.
354. See id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See Huber v. Calcasieu Marine Nat’l Bank of Lake Charles, 262 So. 2d
404, 407 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
358. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2235 (2018).
359. Id.
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allows parties to override the default rules and forum selection clauses by
consent: “[T]he proper court shall be any court agreed to by all trustees,
beneficiaries, and living settlors.”360
The jurisdiction and venue rules of § 2235 have not given rise to much
controversy. Two cases, however, provide some additional insight. In re
Dendinger explained a rule that should be obvious: The term “proper
court” does not mean the exact same division of a district court. 361 As the
court stated: “It is well settled in Louisiana law that each judicial district
constitutes a single court.”362 Although some judicial districts have
multiple divisions, those divisions do “not operate to sever a single district
court into multiple courts.”363 Accordingly, “nothing in the Louisiana
Trust Code requires a petition for instructions to be considered by the same
section or division of court that conducted the succession proceedings.” 364
Marston v. Premier Bank, N.A., is more significant.365 That case
demonstrated that in litigation with multiple theories of recovery—for
example, traditional trust theories and tort theories—the venue and
jurisdiction supplied by the “proper court” rules of § 2235 may override
other possible venue and jurisdiction rules. Generally, “suits instituted on
different theories of recovery may be brought in the venue which is proper
for any theory alleged in the suit.”366 The court recognized that trusts
constitute an “exception to this rule” and noted that “[e]ven if other actions
are joined with a suit against the trustee for removal and/or breach of trust,
the Trust Code requires the action to be brought in the ‘proper
court’. . . .”367
C. Types of Proceedings and Related Issues
The Trust Code generally permits actions relating to trusts to be tried
as summary proceedings. Certain factual or procedural scenarios,
however, may require a different type of proceeding.

360.
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1. General Rule: Summary Proceeding
Many actions relating to trusts and their administration may be
brought as summary proceedings. Section 2231 of the Trust Code
provides: “If a cause or right of action accrues to a beneficiary against a
trustee or a settlor or both, to a trustee against a beneficiary or a settlor or
both, or to a settlor against a beneficiary or a trustee or both, the action
may be by summary proceeding.”368
2. Other Types of Proceedings
There are a handful of exceptions to the default rule allowing summary
proceedings. The nature of the relief sought might require a different type
of proceeding. For example, the Trust Code contemplates that injunctive
relief might be an appropriate remedy in some circumstances.369 If
injunctive relief is sought, then the Code of Civil Procedure articles
relating to injunctive relief govern the proceeding.370
If a party is seeking instructions from the court relating to a trust, then
there are additional procedural options. Trust Code § 2233 provides that a
“[a] trustee, a beneficiary, or a settlor in an ordinary or a summary
proceeding may apply to the proper court for instructions concerning the
trust instrument, the interpretation of the instrument, or the administration
of the trust.”371 Summary proceedings are usually faster and less
expensive; therefore, they are preferable to ordinary proceedings in most
cases.
The trustee has the additional option of seeking instructions via “ex
parte proceedings.”372 There is a downside to this option, however.
Instructions issued by a court pursuant to a summary or ordinary
proceeding “shall be full authority to act in accordance thereunder, and a
trustee shall be fully protected from all claims of any person who has or
who may subsequently acquire an interest in the trust property.”373 In
contrast, instructions obtained via an ex parte proceeding “will protect a
third party relying on the order, but will not exonerate a trustee from
liability to a settlor or a beneficiary.”374 The purpose of the ex parte
368. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2231 (2018).
369. Id.§§ 9:2221; 9:2232.
370. Id. § 9:2232; accord Fryar v. Westside Habilitation Ctr., Inc., 425 So. 2d
804, 804 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
371. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2233.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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proceeding “is to enable the trustee to deal efficiently with third persons
pursuant to instructions so obtained ex parte, but without prejudice to the
rights of the settlor or beneficiary to hold the trustee liable for breach of
his trust in such regard.”375 For that reason, ex parte proceedings are
usually ill-advised in disputes between the beneficiary and the trustee.
D. Remedies Available: Instructions and Injunctions
Two useful remedies in the trust setting are instructions and
injunctions. As explained in more detail below, instructions and
injunctions might be sought by the trustee, the beneficiary, the settlor, or
a third party. In this respect, instructions and injunctions are more than just
remedies. They are useful tools that may serve a variety of purposes in the
trust setting.
1. Instructions
The settlor, the trustee, or the beneficiary “may apply to the proper
court for instructions concerning the trust instrument, the interpretation of
the instrument, or the administration of the trust.”376 As explained above,
the application may be by ordinary or summary proceeding, and the
application of the trustee may also be ex parte. Jurisprudence reveals that
the application for instructions might be styled in a variety of manners,
including as a “petition for declaratory judgment,”377 a “petition for
instructions,”378 or an “application for instructions.”379
Reported decisions and secondary sources provide many helpful
illustrations of when an application for instructions might be appropriate,
and courts should be generous in allowing such applications.380 Louisiana
cases, for example, have considered questions relating to whether a
particular individual is a beneficiary,381 whether a party is entitled to
375. In re Gulf Oxygen Welder’s Supply Profit Sharing Plan & Tr. Agreement,
297 So. 2d 663, 667 (La. 1974).
376. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2233.
377. E.g., Dawson v. Dorignac, No. 17–316, 2017 WL 9916475, at *2 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 2017).
378. E.g., In re Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens Living Tr., 229 So. 3d 36,
40 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017); In re Robert P. Breazeale, Jr., Tr., 2016 CA 1003,
2017 WL 3573991, at *1 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017).
379. Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., 195 So. 3d 624, 628 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2016).
380. E.g., BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 559.
381. Scott, 195 So. 3d at 628. Some unpublished decisions are also relevant.
E.g., Dawson, 2017 WL 9916475; Breazeale, Jr., 2017 WL 3573991, at *2–4.
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various documents relating to the trust,382 questions of attorney–client
privilege,383 questions of the term of a trust,384 and whether a beneficiary’s
actions implicated a no-contest provision.385
The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the constitutionality and
meaning of the instruction remedy in some detail in Gulf Oxygen Welder’s
Supply Trust.386 First, the trustee may apply for instructions “only if there
is reasonable doubt as to his duties or powers as trustee.”387 Second, the
trustee “is not entitled to instructions as to questions which may never arise
or which may arise in the future but which have not yet arisen, or as to
matters resting within his discretion.”388 At least one court has taken a
liberal view of this requirement and held that the trustee did not abuse his
discretion in seeking instructions on matters ultimately found to be within
his discretion where the “action . . . was necessitated by the ongoing
suspicion and lack of cooperation between the Trust’s second and third
beneficiaries.”389 Third, the costs of seeking instructions are chargeable
against the trust estate unless “the application for instructions is plainly
unwarranted, so that it was improper for the trustee to incur such
expense.”390 Fourth, any adversely affected beneficiaries ought to be
parties to the proceeding, even if not strictly required by the statute,
because “such instructions cannot be binding on the beneficiaries as
against the trustee, where [the beneficiaries] have had no notice or
opportunity to be heard.”391 Unfortunately, Gulf Oxygen Welder’s Supply
Trust did little to elaborate on these guidelines, and few other courts have
considered the issues.
Gulf Oxygen Welder’s Supply Trust did not address whether or how
the factors it set forth might differ if the party seeking instructions is the
beneficiary or the settlor. For example, Gulf Oxygen Welder’s Supply
Trust noted that the trustee could recover his expenses from the trust

382. Scott, 195 So. 3d at 628. Some unpublished decisions are also relevant.
E.g., Dawson, 2017 WL 9916475, at *5–7.
383. Eleanor Pierce, 229 So. 3d at 40–41.
384. Richards v. Richards, 408 So. 2d 1209, 1211 n.4 (La. 1981).
385. Hughes v. Burguieres, 276 So. 2d 267, 268 (La. 1973).
386. See generally In re Gulf Oxygen Welder’s Supply Profit Sharing Plan and
Tr. Agreement, 297 So. 2d 663 (La. 1974).
387. Id. at 667.
388. Id.
389. In re Abadie Inter Vivos Tr., 791 So. 2d 181, 189 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2001).
390. Gulf Oxygen, 297 So. 2d at 667.
391. Id.
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estate.392 Unclear from the decision is whether a settlor or beneficiary is
entitled to a similar benefit. This important question is without a clear
answer, and plausible arguments can be made either way. Louisiana has a
jurisprudential approach, likely amounting to jurisprudence constante,
that “[a]s a general rule, attorney fees are not allowed in Louisiana unless
they are authorized by statute or provided for by contract.”393 Payment of
the trustee’s attorneys’ fees is generally allowed by statute.394 The Trust
Code, however, contains no comparable provisions relating to
beneficiaries or settlors. In short, there appears to be no statutory authority
allowing for recovery of attorneys’ fees by those parties.
On the other hand, the rationale behind Louisiana’s general
prohibition of attorneys’ fees is not necessarily implicated in the usual
application for instructions. The general prohibition stems from the view
that attorneys’ fees are often penal in nature. They are “imposed not to
make the injured party whole, but rather to discourage a particular activity
on the part of the opposing party.”395 A beneficiary seeking payment of
attorneys’ fees from the property of the trust, rather than from the trustee
personally, would not necessarily punish the trustee. Moreover, the
approach in other jurisdictions suggests that attorneys’ fees should be
allowed if the litigation is beneficial to the trust.396
2. Injunctive Relief
The Trust Code specifically contemplates injunctive relief in two
places—the effect of which can be somewhat confusing. As discussed in
Sections II.D.2 and III.D.1 above, injunctive relief is generally permitted
in Louisiana “in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may
otherwise result to the applicant, or in other cases specifically provided by

392. Id.
393. Langley v. Petro Star Corp., 792 So. 2d 721, 723 (La. 2001); accord
Huddleston v. Bossier Bank & Tr. Co., 475 So. 2d 1082, 1085 (La. 1985); In re
Mashburn Marital Trs., 52 So. 3d 1136, 1142 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010).
394. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2191 provides that the “trustee is entitled
to indemnity from the trust estate for expenses properly incurred by him in the
administration of the trust.” LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2191 (2018). Expenses incurred
by the trustee who seeks instructions from the court normally fall within this
indemnity. See, e.g., Favrot v. Favrot, 115 So. 3d 1190, 1196 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 2013) (noting that trustee is permitted to “incur litigation expenses, including
attorney’s fees”).
395. Langley, 792 So. 2d at 723.
396. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1004 and accompanying comments.
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law.”397 The Trust Code authorizes injunctive relief in general terms in
§ 2232:
If irreparable injury, loss, or damage will otherwise result, the
injunctive relief authorized by Articles 3601 through 3613 of the
Code of Civil Procedure may be granted to a beneficiary as against
a trustee or a settlor or both, to a trustee against a beneficiary or a
settlor or both, or to a settlor against a beneficiary or a trustee or
both.398
This provision simply incorporates the default rules of injunctive relief
found in the Code of Civil Procedure. In some cases, the irreparable injury
standard will prohibit injunctive relief because some damages relating to
trustee malfeasance are clearly pecuniary in nature.399
Section 2221 of the Trust Code also authorizes the beneficiary to seek
injunctive relief in certain instances without a showing of irreparable
harm: “A beneficiary of a trust may institute an action: (1) To compel a
trustee to perform his duties as trustee; (2) To enjoin a trustee from
committing a breach of trust; (3) To compel a trustee to redress a breach
of trust; (4) To remove a trustee.”400 Relief sought under (1), (2), or (3)
might take the form of injunctive relief depending on the facts and
circumstances of the case. The jurisprudence offers little guidance on the
procedural aspects of actions brought under § 2221. It is, however, readily
understood by reference to other laws.
Where a beneficiary seeks injunctive relief under § 2221, a showing
of irreparable harm is not required. Code of Civil Procedure article 3601
permits injunctions to issue without a showing of irreparable harm in
“cases specifically provided by law.”401 As Professor Maraist explains in
his treatise, “[t]he ‘cases’ that fall within this category are statutes that
provide for injunctive relief under certain circumstances.”402 Section 2221
falls squarely within this category of statutes by authorizing injunctive
relief for a beneficiary without requiring a showing of irreparable harm.
This approach is also consistent with the common law and the law in other

397. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3601 (2018).
398. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2232 (2018).
399. See Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. Blossman, 583 So. 2d 5, 5–7 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 1991).
400. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2221.
401. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3601.
402. Frank L. Maraist, Civil Procedure-Special Proceedings, in 1A LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 1.2, 8 (2d ed. 2018).
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states.403 Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy404 and, as such, one that
is appropriately applied in the trust context without a showing of
irreparable harm where there is an actual or threatened breach of fiduciary
duty.405
E. Remedies Available: Beneficiary Actions Against the Trustee
The Trust Code allows the beneficiary to seek and obtain a number of
remedies against the trustee: (1) to compel the trustee to perform his duties
as trustee; (2) to enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust; (3) to
compel a trustee to redress a breach of trust; and (4) to remove the
trustee.406 Often, the beneficiary will seek multiple remedies in the same
action, sometimes in the alternative.407 This approach is usually
appropriate, and it is often important for purposes of avoiding prescription
and ensuring judicial economy.
The appropriate procedure for these actions depends on the underlying
relief sought. For example, a beneficiary might seek an injunction to
prevent a trustee from committing a breach of trust, in which case the
procedural rules governing injunctive relief apply. Alternatively, a
beneficiary might want to bring an action to compel the trustee to render
an accounting. This can usually be accomplished through a summary
proceeding using either a petition or a rule to show cause against the
trustee.408
1. Compelling the Trustee to Perform His Duties as Trustee
A beneficiary might sue to compel trustee performance of a number
of duties. The suit may seek injunctive relief. A court order instructing the
403. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 861.
404. Maraist, supra note 402, § 1.2.
405. See Mark R. Caldwell, Elliott E. Burdette, & Edward L. Rice, Winning
the Battle and the War: A Remedies-Centered Approach to Litigation Involving
Durable Powers of Attorney, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 435, 452 (2012); BOGERT &
BOGERT, supra note 29, § 861.
406. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2221 (2018).
407. See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 519, 520 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1995) (involved a “petition for revocation of a trust, alternatively for removal of
the trustee”); Brown v. Schwegmann, 861 So. 2d 862, 865 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2003) (suit for removal of trustee and damages).
408. See, e.g., Grant v. Grant, 734 So. 2d 68, 72 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1999)
(“The Trust Code allows a beneficiary to institute an action to compel the trustee
to perform his duties . . . . Plaintiff exercised this right by filing a rule for an
accounting, and she obtained financial records for each year of the trust.”).
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trustee to perform some duty, however, may also suffice. If the trustee fails
to comply with a court order, additional remedies exist, including being
held in contempt of court,409 being removed as trustee,410 and being held
liable for damages.411 The following discussion highlights some of the
more common issues relating to nonperformance of a trustee’s duties.
a. Furnishing Information
Tensions sometimes arise when the trustee and the beneficiary have
difficulty communicating with each other.412 Communication issues might
stem from underlying intrafamily dynamics and personality conflicts.413 A
beneficiary may, understandably, become suspicious of a trustee with
whom he has a poor relationship or who is not responsive to
communication requests. A trustee may become equally frustrated with a
beneficiary who is overbearing or demanding. Yet the trustee is obligated
to communicate with the beneficiary and to provide the beneficiary with
information under certain circumstances. The communication obligation
“is critical to the administration of a trust, because the beneficiaries must
have the information in order to monitor the trustee and the decisions made
with respect to trust property.”414
If a beneficiary is concerned about the administration of the trust,
requesting information from the trustee is a logical first step. If the trustee
refuses to provide the information requested, then the beneficiary could
bring an action under § 2221 of the Trust Code to compel performance. A
trustee could also be found in breach of his fiduciary duties for his refusal
or failure to communicate with a beneficiary.
The scope of the trustee’s duty to furnish information has not often
been considered by Louisiana courts. At first blush, Louisiana seems to

409. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 221–27 (2018); Boyd v. Boyd, 57 So. 3d
1169, 1178–79 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2011).
410. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2221.
411. Id. § 9:2201.
412. See, e.g., Albritton v. Albritton, 622 So. 2d 709, 714 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 1993) (“The evidence at the trial of this matter further established that over
the last 13 years the relationship between Dr. Albritton [the trustee] and his son
[the beneficiary] has deteriorated to the point where they only communicate
through their respective attorneys.”); Martin v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 519, 522 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995) (trustee said he did not refuse to communicate with sisterin-law beneficiary “during rational times.”).
413. See supra text accompanying note 412.
414. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 541.
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take a conservative approach to the trustee’s duty to furnish information
compared to other jurisdictions. Section 2089 of the Trust Code provides:
A trustee shall give to a beneficiary upon his request at reasonable
times complete and accurate information as to the nature and
amount of the trust property, and permit him, or a person duly
authorized by him, to inspect the subject matter of the trust, and
the accounts, vouchers, and other documents relating to the
trust.415
If this statute stood in isolation, it could imply that the trustee’s duty is
merely responsive in nature.
The modern trend in other jurisdictions is to make it clear that
proactive disclosure is sometimes required.416 The position adopted by the
Uniform Trust Code (UTC), for example, puts the ball in the trustee’s
court: “A trustee shall keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust
reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the
material facts necessary for them to protect their interests.”417 The UTC
specifies a number of instances where proactive disclosure is required,
including advance notice “of any change in the method or rate of the
trustee’s compensation” and notice “that a formerly revocable trust has
become irrevocable.”418
Although Louisiana has not enacted statutes similar to those of the
UTC, such statutes are not necessary to impose an affirmative duty on a
trustee to keep beneficiaries informed about the administration of the trust
in Louisiana. A proactive duty already exists in Louisiana by virtue of the
trustee’s overarching obligations of prudence or care, loyalty, and good
faith.419
Louisiana courts have distinguished between the duty to provide
information and the accounting duty. A trustee may be obligated to
415. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2089.
416. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759 (2018). Unfortunately, the jurisprudence and
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise § 14:7 have failed to fully appreciate this point. It
is, however, well recognized in analogous circumstances. See, e.g., Langendorf v.
Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 361 So. 2d 905, 908–09, 910 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1978); Succession of Ferguson, 114 So. 3d 1260, 1264 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
2013); Succession of Hearn, 412 So. 2d 692, 700 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1982);
Succession of Mangle, 452 So. 2d 197, 201 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1984); see also
Estate of Carter, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 490, 499 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that
Louisiana imposed a more onerous duty to inform than other jurisdictions).
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provide information to a beneficiary, even if he is not required to render
an accounting. The trustee of a revocable trust, for example, is only
required to account to the settlor.420 The duty to furnish information to the
beneficiary, however, exists regardless of whether the trust is revocable or
irrevocable.421
b. Accounting
The trustee is obligated “to keep and render clear and accurate
accounts of the administration of the trust.”422 The trustee must annually
render accountings to the beneficiary—or to the settlor in the case of
revocable trusts—and must also render an accounting when the trustee
leaves his office and when the trust is terminated or revoked.423 The UTC
takes a similar approach, and, as a result, a similar obligation exists in
many states.424 Tutors, curators, and succession representatives have
comparable accounting obligations in Louisiana. Of course, the trustee
might elect to render accountings more frequently,425 or the trust
instrument might require him to do so. The trust instrument cannot,
however, eliminate or reduce the accounting obligation set forth in the
Trust Code.426
As a practical matter, if the trustee fails to render an accounting, the
beneficiary might simply ask him to do so before filing suit. If the trustee
then fails to render an accounting or renders a deficient accounting, then
an action for an accounting is an appropriate and useful preliminary
remedy.427 The action for an accounting serves many of the same functions
in the trust context that it does in other fiduciary litigation. The demand
for accounting can operate like a litmus test, giving the beneficiary the
opportunity to gauge the dispositions of the judge, the trustee, and any
other parties. It is also a fairly inexpensive, low risk, and quick course of
action. The trustee, like some other Louisiana fiduciaries, usually has no
420. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2088 (2018).
421. See Boyd v. Boyd, 57 So. 3d 1169, 1177 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2011).
422. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2088.
423. Id.
424. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 963.
425. See Landry v. Blaise, Inc., 774 So. 2d 187, 191 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2000).
426. Edward E. Chase, Jr., Trusts, in 11 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE §
14:6, 101 (2d ed. 2018).
427. A court may find that a rendered accounting to the beneficiary is deficient
and order a new accounting. See Thomas v. Kneipp, 986 So. 2d 175, 184 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 2008).
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defense to a demand for an accounting because the accounting obligation
is mandatory. If the trustee provides a proper accounting, the accounting
itself will help provide any necessary evidence of the trustee’s
malfeasance.428 Sometimes, a trustee refuses to comply with a court order
to provide an accounting, or the trustee provides a deficient accounting.429
Failure to render an appropriate accounting pursuant to a court order
provides the beneficiary with additional evidence of malfeasance,
justifying removal of the trustee and other remedies.430
2. Enjoining a Breach of Trust
A beneficiary may bring an action “[t]o enjoin a trustee from
committing a breach of trust.”431 As discussed in Section IV.D.2, a court
may issue injunctive relief to prevent a trustee from committing a breach
of the trust without requiring a showing of irreparable harm. A simple
court order prohibiting the trustee from engaging in a particular action may
also be sufficient in some cases.
3. Removal of Trustee
Trustees “shall be removed in accordance with the provisions of the
trust instrument or by the proper court for sufficient cause.”432 The Trust
Code does not elaborate on the meaning of sufficient cause. The Louisiana
Trust Estates Law was similarly vague: “For sufficient cause shown, a

428. E.g., Brown v. Schwegmann, 861 So. 2d 862, 869–70 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 2003) (accounting documents demonstrated trustee engaged in self-dealing,
failed to segregate trust funds, and engaged in other breaches of his fiduciary
duty).
429. E.g., Thomas, 986 So. 2d at 185 (court found the formal accounting filed
by the trustee after being ordered to do so was insufficient); Bridwell v. Bridwell,
381 So. 2d 566, 567–88 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1980) (trustee “failed to comply
with the judgment [ordering her to provide an accounting] and contempt
proceedings were had resulting in her incarceration.”).
430. E.g., Boyd v. Boyd, 57 So. 3d 1169, 1173 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2011);
Brown, 990 So. 2d at 1287.
431. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2221 (2018).
432. Id. § 9:1789. Additional grounds exist for removing a corporate trustee. Id.
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trustee may be removed by the proper court.”433 In other words, since
1938, the standard for removal of a trustee has been “sufficient cause.”434
a. General Standard and Comparison to Other Laws
Although Louisiana’s trustee removal statute has remained virtually
unchanged since 1938, Louisiana appellate courts did not begin to consider
the meaning of “sufficient cause” until the 1970s and 1980s.435 Despite
their failure to provide any meaningful analysis or citation, it appears that
Louisiana courts essentially adopted the position of the First and Second
Restatements.436 This reliance is misplaced because it wholly ignores the
well-developed bodies of law and jurisprudence in Louisiana related to
other fiduciaries.
“Sufficient cause” should be understood by reference to the Trust
Code as a whole. It should also be understood by reference to other
Louisiana laws regulating fiduciaries, such as tutors, curators, and
succession representatives.437 The legislative schemes applicable to tutors,
curators, and succession representatives have much in common with the
laws governing trustees. All of these legislative schemes contemplate that
the fiduciary may be removed through court action if sufficient grounds
exist. A curator may be removed by the court for “good cause.”438 Other
statutory provisions give various, non-exclusive examples of good
cause.439 Similarly, a tutor may be removed if, among other reasons, he
“has become disqualified; . . . has become incapable of discharging the
duties of his office; has mismanaged the minor’s property; [or] has failed
to perform any duty imposed by law or by order of court . . . .”440 A
succession representative may be removed if, among other reasons, he
“has become disqualified, has become incapable of discharging the duties
433. LA. REV. STAT. TITLE 9 APP. § 9:1877 (1950). The statute was in effect
from 1938.
434. The phrase was likely borrowed from the Restatement (First) of Trusts.
See, e.g., Hagerty v. Clement, 196 So. 330, 333 (La. 1940) (noting that the
Restatement was the basis of the Louisiana Trust Estates Act of 1938).
435. See, e.g., Succession of Supple, 274 So. 2d 790 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1973); see also Succession of Dunham, 408 So. 2d 888, 901 (La. 1981) (noting
that only two other cases had previously dealt with trustee removal: Supple and
Holladay).
436. Id.
437. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 12–13 (2018); P. RAY LAMONICA & JERRY
G. JONES, LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE HANDBOOK § 7:7 (2018).
438. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 4568 (2018).
439. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1025 (2018); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 4566(j).
440. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 4234.
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of his office, has mismanaged the estate, has failed to perform any duty
imposed by law or by order of court.”441 Jurisprudence in these areas can
help resolve many unanswered questions regarding trustee removal in
Louisiana.
Louisiana jurisprudence generally supports the view that a trustee may
be removed for similar reasons that allow removal of a succession
representative, curator, or tutor. In other words, good cause may exist
where: (1) the trustee has become disqualified; (2) the trustee is incapable
of discharging his duties; (3) the trustee mismanaged the trust; or (4) the
trustee failed to perform any duty imposed by law or by order of the court.
The following sections consider each of these grounds for removal.
b. Trustee Has Become Disqualified
Sufficient cause for removal exists if the trustee no longer possesses
the requisite statutory requirements for serving as trustee.442 For example,
a natural person may serve as trustee if he has “full capacity to contract”
and “is a citizen . . . of the United States.”443 If a trustee relinquished his
citizenship, then removal would be an appropriate remedy.444 The phrase
“full capacity to contract” should be understood by reference to the Civil
Code articles on capacity.445 Persons who have reached the age of majority
are generally presumed to possess full contractual capacity.446 Full
interdicts, by definition, lack the requisite capacity.447 A limited interdict
will usually lack the requisite capacity.448 Thus, sufficient cause clearly
exists for an interdict’s removal. A trustee might also lose capacity without
the necessity of an interdiction proceeding, and removal would be an
appropriate course of action.
441. Id. art. 3182.
442. Louisiana courts have apparently not considered the issue. This view is
supported by the laws governing tutors, curators, and succession representatives.
The various Restatements also support this view. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TRUSTS § 107 (AM. LAW INST. 1928); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107
(AM. LAW INST. 1953); and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 32 (AM. LAW
INST. 2003).
443. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1783.
444. For the method by which citizenship may be relinquished, see 8 U.S.C. §
1481 (2018).
445. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1783.
446. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1918 (2018).
447. Id. art. 395.
448. Id. art. 396. It is conceivable, but unlikely, that a limited interdict has full
contractual capacity, and only matters of personal care are the subject matter of
the interdiction.
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Disqualification might also be viewed more broadly. A trustee should
possess a certain degree of skill, ability, and trustworthiness, and a court
should remove a trustee who demonstrates a lack of these qualities. For
example, a trustee who is shown to have a history of theft, embezzlement,
or other financial impropriety could be removed by a court. Civil Code
article 1481 mandates the removal of a trustee who “commits fraud or
exercises duress or unduly influences a donor . . . or whose appointment is
procured by such means.” As discussed above in connection with
succession representatives, a court might remove a trustee on this basis,
even if there has not yet been a trial on the merits of fraud, duress, or undue
influence. The same is true if there are credible allegations of ingratitude
or unworthiness against the trustee.
c. Trustee Is Incapable of Discharging the Duties of His Office
The trustee should be removed if he is incapable of discharging the
duties of the office of trustee. Many of the reasons a succession
representative might be incapable are applicable in the trust setting. A
trustee who lacks sufficient education, training, or business acumen might
be incapable of discharging his duties.449 A trustee who possessed the
requisite skills and abilities might later lose those traits as a result of
mental or physical decline, in which case removal would likewise be
appropriate.
A practical obstacle might prevent a trustee from being able to
administer the trust. The nature of the trust property might, for example,
require the attention of a trustee who can be physically present and
hands-on in its administration. This would result in a practical obstacle to
a trustee who resides far away from the trust property. Additionally,
although felony conviction is not an automatic disqualification from
serving as trustee, an incarcerated trustee would likely be incapable of
discharging the duties of his office as a result of his incarceration.
A conflict of interest may result in a trustee becoming unable to
discharge the duties of the office. A conflict is not generally a basis for
removal unless it adversely affects the administration of the trust.
Louisiana courts are particularly forgiving of trustee conflicts “where the
settlor knew of the potential conflict at the time the trust was created and
the trustee named.”450

449. See supra Section III.D.3.
450. Succession of Noe, 398 So. 2d 1173, 1177 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981);
accord McCaffery v. Lindner, 263 So. 3d 1205, 1210 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2018).
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Quite a few Louisiana cases involve calls for a trustee’s removal due
to hostility between the trustee and the beneficiary.451 Hostility is not
grounds for removal “unless it materially impairs or interferes with the
proper administration of the trust.”452 Hostility can easily impact the
trustee’s willingness or ability to fulfill his obligations as trustee. In
Albritton v. Albritton, the relationship between the trustee and beneficiary,
who were father and son, had “deteriorated to the point where they only
communicate[d] through their respective attorneys.”453 As the court
explained: “The hostility and ill will appear deep-seated and in the light of
human experience it is difficult if not impossible to believe that Dr.
Albritton’s actions as trustee will remain unaffected by these emotions.”454
d. Trustee Has Mismanaged the Trust
The “trustee should be removed if the trust estate is obviously being
mismanaged.”455 Mismanagement can occur in a number of different
manners, many of which are similar to mismanagement in other fiduciary
settings. Misappropriation of trust funds, imprudent investments, and
similar acts of mismanagement are grounds for removal.456 Brown v.
Schwegmann is a helpful example of a trustee who engaged in several acts
of mismanagement justifying his removal.457 The trustee misappropriated
trust funds by allowing them to be diverted for his own personal use.458
The trustee failed to invest the trust funds in a prudent manner because he
continued to invest all of the funds in a family business when he should
have diversified the investment.459 The trustee also failed to maintain and
render accounts and commingled trust funds in violation of the express
provisions of the Louisiana Trust Code.460
The trustee is required to administer the trust in accordance with the
terms of the trust instrument and applicable law. Failure to do so may
constitute mismanagement justifying removal. In Albritton, the trustee’s
451. E.g., Thomas v. Kneipp, 986 So. 2d 175 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2008).
452. Noe, 398 So. 2d at 1177; accord McCaffery, 263 So. 3d at 1210; Thomas,
986 So. 2d at 187.
453. Albritton v. Albritton, 622 So. 2d 709, 714 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
454. Id. at 715.
455. Succession of Supple, 274 So. 2d 790, 794 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
456. See Albritton, 622 So. 2d at 715; Succession of Dunham, 408 So. 2d 888,
900–01 (La. 1981).
457. Brown v. Schwegmann, 861 So. 2d 862, 868 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2003).
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 868–70.
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removal was supported by the fact that he obtained an “extension of the
trust [that] was in clear contravention of the trust code and the settlor’s
wishes.”461 The trustee is obligated to “administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiary”462 Failure to do so may also constitute
mismanagement.463
e. Trustee Has Failed to Perform Any Duty Imposed by Law, by the
Trust Instrument, or by Order of Court
Failure to comply with a court order or failure to perform the various
administrative duties imposed on trustees by the Trust Code or by the trust
itself may justify removal. In considering the significance of a trustee’s
noncompliance with administrative rules and laws, Louisiana courts have
reached similar conclusions in the trust setting as in the succession
representative setting. Mere technical violations are usually insufficient
grounds for removal, particularly if they do not appear to be in bad faith.464
Violations coupled with other facts or particularly egregious failures,
however, should justify removal.
Simply failing to provide an annual accounting, for example, is not
typically grounds for removal.465 Failure to render an accounting coupled
with other problems, however, may result in removal.466 In Fontenot v.
Choppin, the court held that removal was warranted when the trustee failed
to render accountings, refused to permit the beneficiary to inspect the trust
records, and failed to distribute income as required by the trust
instrument.467 Further, the trustee “had failed to collect all of the assets of
the Trust and had filed inaccurate income tax returns.”468 In Martin v.
Martin, removal was appropriate where the trustee refused to
communicate with the beneficiary, failed to provide accountings, failed to

461. Albritton, 622 So. 2d at 715.
462. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2082 (2018).
463. See, e.g., Albritton, 622 So. 2d at 715; Martinez v. Alto Emps.’ Tr., 273
So. 2d 735 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
464. In re Edward Wisner Donation, 150 So. 3d 391, 402 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 2014); Thomas v. Kneipp, 986 So. 2d 175, 184 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2008);
In re Mashburn Marital Trs., 951 So. 2d 1136, 1147 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006).
465. See Thomas, 986 So. 2d at 185.
466. But see McCaffery v. Lindner, 262 So. 3d 1205 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
2018) (court did not remove trustee despite her egregious breaches of trust).
467. Fontenot ex rel. Fontenot v. Choppin, 836 So. 2d 322, 324–25 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2002).
468. Id.
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distribute income as required by trust instrument, and did not allow the
beneficiary to inspect records pertaining to the trust.469
4. Compelling a Trustee to Redress a Breach of Trust: Money
Damages
A beneficiary may bring an action “to compel a trustee to redress a
breach of trust.”470 Redress is usually in the form of money damages, and
awards are calculated in a manner similar to that in actions against
mandataries and succession representatives. The Trust Code specifies the
types of damages or harms for which a trustee may be held accountable:
“(1) A loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from the
breach of trust; or (2) A profit made by the trustee through breach of trust;
or (3) A profit that would have accrued to the trust estate if there had been
no breach of trust.”471 The provision is based on the Restatement (First) of
Trusts,472 which notes that the “three types of remedies are not always
distinct and are not always all of them available.”473 Again, similar
remedies are available against mandataries and succession representatives.
The trustee may be held liable for “a loss or depreciation in value of
the trust estate resulting from a breach of trust.”474 These damages are
essentially measured by the loss in value or by the cost of restoration.
Restoration damages are appropriate in a variety of cases, including cases
where the trustee appropriates funds for his personal use. In In re Bradford
Trust, the trustee allowed the settlor to divert funds for purposes not
authorized by the trust instrument, including $4,212.50 for football tickets
and vacation expenses.475 The Court held that this was a breach of trust
and ordered the trustee to repay the funds to the trust.476 Similarly, in
McCaffery v. Linder, the trustee—who was also the income beneficiary—
improperly distributed about $900,000 in principal to herself while she
served as trustee, and she was ordered to restore the funds to the trust.477
Trustees may also be liable for disgorgement and lost profit damages.
The trustee in In re Bradford Trust also breached his duties as trustee when
469. Martin v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 519 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
470. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2221 (2018).
471. Id. § 9:2201.
472. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2201 Editor’s Note, cmt. b (1964).
473. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1928).
474. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2201.
475. In re Bradford Tr., 538 So. 2d 263, 268–69 (La. 1989).
476. Id. (trustee was only ordered to repay two-thirds of the funds because he
had settled with one beneficiary).
477. McCaffery v. Linder, 263 So. 3d 1205 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2018).
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he sold off stock in Lehman Corporation and then allowed more than
$100,000 of the proceeds to be loaned to another party without any
security.478 The loan was only repaid—with 7% interest—after suit was
instigated. The Court said that repayment with interest was insufficient for
measuring damages. Rather, disgorgement of the dividends paid by
Lehman after the sale was the appropriate remedy.479 Comparable
disgorgement damages are clearly allowed against mandataries and ought
to also be allowed against succession representatives in appropriate
cases.480
Finally, the trustee in Bridwell v. Bridwell was ordered to pay
reimbursement and disgorgement damages after she misappropriated
funds from the sale of trust property.481 The court ordered the trustee to
reimburse the trust for the amount of the funds and additionally held her
liable “for the income that would have accrued to the trust if the funds had
been prudently invested.”482 The trustee had apparently placed the trust
funds in her personal account, which accrued interest at the rate of 7.5%.483
The court used that number to measure the interest, in effect ordering
disgorgement of her profit.484
F. Prescription
Although the jurisprudence on this point is generally lacking, actions
against trustees ought to be governed by the same basic rules applicable to
mandataries and succession representatives. Actions for breach of
fiduciary duty, demands for accounting, and similar actions are personal
actions subject to a 10-year prescriptive period.
1. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2244: Prescription for Issues
Disclosed in an Accounting
If a trustee has rendered an accounting, the Trust Code sets forth a
shorter prescriptive period of two or three years. Any “action for damages
by a beneficiary against a trustee for any act, omission, or breach of duty”
that is disclosed in an accounting is subject to the two- or three-year period

478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
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See supra Sections II.D.4 and II.D.5.
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set forth in § 2234 of the Trust Code.485 The statute sets forth the
mechanics of delivering the accounting and special rules applicable to
minors who are beneficiaries.486 The prescriptive periods set out in § 2234
“are peremptive periods that are triggered by an accounting rendered and
delivered by the trustee.”487 Furthermore, “[t]he burden is on the trustee to
show when he made an accounting sufficient to trigger the commencement
of the time periods.”488
2. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 6:1124: One-Year Prescription for
Financial Institutions
If a financial institution is acting as trustee or fiduciary, an even
shorter prescriptive period may apply. Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 6:1124 provides that when a financial institution is acting as trustee or
other fiduciary, “[a]ny claim for breach of a fiduciary responsibility of a
financial institution or any officer or employee thereof may only be
asserted within one year of the first occurrence thereof.”
CONCLUSION
Fiduciary litigation poses many interesting practical and theoretical
challenges in Louisiana. Louisiana’s unique legal heritage and the
piecemeal revision and enactment of laws has, predictably, resulted in
occasional confusion and inconsistency. Courts have understandably
struggled to correctly resolve important legal issues. Too often, courts
have turned to inappropriate common law sources and methodologies to
resolve issues readily addressed by our private civil law system. This
Article takes a preliminary step toward creating more cohesive and
comprehensive guidance for courts and practitioners in resolving
questions relating to fiduciaries in the estate planning setting.

485.
486.
487.
488.
2011).
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